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Fordham: Disabilitiy and Designer Babies

Article
DISABILITY AND DESIGNER BABIES
Brigham A. Fordham*
If deaf parents purposely use new genetic technologies to
give their child the genes for deafness, have the parents
harmed the child? This and similar questions regarding
parents who make genetic choices in favor of disability have
preoccupied much of the scholarship regarding new artificial
reproductive technologies. Some have argued that we should
determine whether a child has been harmed by pondering
whether the child’s “right to an open future” has been violated
by the parents’ genetic intervention. If that right is violated,
some say, the parents should be subject to tort liability for
inflicting a harm upon the child.
This Article considers the consequences of attempting to
hold parents liable in tort for making genetic decisions in favor
of socially disfavored physical attributes, such as disabilities.
A legal scheme that asks judges and juries to separate “good”
physical attributes from “bad” ones is problematic, especially
when dealing with disabilities. Parents who have personal
experience with the physical traits in question are better
equipped to decide what is best for their offspring than jurors
who have less experience and less at stake. Using the “open
future” framework to second-guess parental decisions about
socially disfavored physical traits only disrupts the parentchild relationship and suggests that discriminatory attitudes
are natural and acceptable.
Moreover, the concern over genetic interventions in favor
of disability is largely misplaced. Disabled parents who want
disabled children are few in number and diverse in purpose.
The recent focus on these parents in the debate over genetic
intervention improperly assumes that such parents are
incapable of making good choices and that the physical traits
they prefer are inherently damning.

Associate Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law; J.D., University of California at
Berkeley; B.A., University of Utah. This Article is dedicated to the memory of my friend
and mentor, Paul K. Longmore, 1945−2010.
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All that is not given is lost.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, a fertility clinic in New York made headlines by
claiming to offer parents the opportunity to choose the eye color, race,
and hair color of their future children.2 The clinic said it could use
genetic testing known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) to
determine which embryos have genetic markers of the parents’ preferred
attributes.3 The embryos with the preferred genetic markers would then
be implanted.4 Some responded with delight to the clinic’s promise to
create so-called “designer babies,” while others condemned the practice.5
There is some doubt whether current technology gives physicians
the ability to do what this clinic advertised—i.e., specifically test for the
genetic markers for attributes like eye color and race in embryos prior to
implantation.6 There is little doubt, however, that such technology will
soon be available.7 Moreover, some predict that before long, scientists
will be able not only to test embryos for specific genetic attributes, but
also they will actually be able to change the genetic structure of the
embryo to match the attributes preferred by the parents.8 The prospect
of genetic manipulation of embryos, often called “genetic intervention,”
raises a number of questions about identity, diversity, and the proper
1
Indian proverb. See Rumer Godden, Luck That Seems Like Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1985 (reviewing DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, THE CITY OF JOY (Kathryn Spink trans., 1985)).
2
Gautam Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles—Hold the Colic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009,
at A10; Hattie Kauffman, “Designer Babies” Ethical?, CBS NEWS: THE EARLY SHOW (Mar. 3,
2009, 7:24 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/03/earlyshow/health/main
4840346.shtml; Gina Salamone, Custom-Made Babies Delivered: Fertility Clinic Doctor’s
Design-A-Kid Offer Creates Uproar, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/2009/03/02/2009-03-02_custommade_babies_delivered_fertility_cl.html
#ixzz0dHZmEE4M.
3
See services cited supra note 2 (explaining that reproductive technologies are allowing
parents to choose the attributes of their children).
4
See services cited supra note 2 (noting that lab-created embryos with the preferred
traits are used).
5
Salamone, supra note 2; see also Kauffman, supra note 2. The owner of the clinic
responded to critics as follows: “Genetic health is the wave of the future . . . . It’s already
happening and it’s not going to go away. It’s going to expand. So if they’ve got major
problems with it, they need to sit down and really examine their own consciences because
there’s nothing that’s going to stop it.” Salamone, supra note 2.
6
See services cited supra note 2 (noting that some doctors question the ability to give
parents their pick of traits).
7
See services cited supra note 2 (suggesting that technology will likely be available in a
couple years).
8
DENA S. DAVIS, GENETIC DILEMMAS 35 (2d ed. 2010); Nancy Pham, Choice v. Chance:
The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human Germline Genetic Modification, 34 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 133, 134 & n.10 (2006) (citing advancing research).
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role of technology in conception. Should genetic intervention be
permitted? If so, should there be limits on which genetic traits may be
chosen? And if we do impose limits, who is best qualified to decide and
enforce those limits?
Presumably, parents who attempt genetic intervention would do so
in the hope of benefitting their child. Recently, however, a number of
commentators have expressed concern that—despite good intentions—
some parents may use genetic intervention to impose upon their
offspring attributes that are actually harmful to the child.9 Two examples
of purportedly harmful genetic interventions are repeated in the
literature, both of which center around parents with disabilities who
want to have a child that shares their same disability. First, deaf parents
might use genetic intervention to have a deaf child.10 Second, parents of
short stature11 might use genetic intervention to have a child with
achondroplasia.12 Worried that deafness and short stature might be
harmful to children, some commentators have called for legal remedies
to prevent parents from using genetic intervention to produce a child
with physical attributes commonly associated with disability.13
Thus, the debate over parental liability for genetic decisions seems to
call for determinations about the consequences of particular disabilities14
and, impliedly, the competence of disabled parents to make beneficial
9
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90; Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary
Biology: A Regulatory Framework for Trait-Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 220–
21 (1993); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability
for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 299–301 (2008) [hereinafter
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions].
10
I have attempted to follow the convention of capitalizing the word “deaf” when
referring to the culture and community and not capitalizing the word when referring to the
physical condition. See Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept.
1993, at 38. In many cases, it is difficult to distinguish the cultural aspects of deafness from
the physical aspects because they overlap.
11
I use the terms “persons of short statute” and “persons with dwarfism” as
interchange. I also make reference to persons with achondroplasia, which is the most
common genetic condition causing dwarfism. See Frequently Asked Questions, LITTLE
PEOPLE AM., http://www.lpaonline.org/mc/page.do?sitePageId=84634&orgId=lpa (last
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (providing answers to numerous questions relevant to dwarfism).
12
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90; Jones, supra note 9, at 223; Smolensky, Genetic
Interventions, supra note 9, at 300, 308.
13
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 299.
14
I use the term “disability” in this Article to refer to physical traits that are generally
associated with disability. Such physical traits might physically limit a person, or the
limitations might derive, in whole or in part, from environmental factors, such as physical
barriers and social attitudes. This definition purposely treats disability as vague and
protean—because so too are the attitudes and environmental factors that can make a
physical trait disabling. To emphasize this point, I use “disability” interchangeably with
“socially disfavored physical traits.”
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genetic decisions for their children.15 In a recent symposium,16 Professor
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky argued that parents who choose genetic
intervention in order to have a child who has a disability should be
subject to tort liability if the parents’ genetic choice is later found to have
violated the child’s “right to an open future.”17 Not wanting to prohibit
all genetic interventions but rather only those that are harmful to
children, Smolensky would leave it to judges and juries to decide when a
parent’s genetic intervention in favor of disability is sufficiently harmful
to warrant liability.18
This Article considers the consequences of attempting to hold
parents liable in tort for making genetic decisions in favor of socially
disfavored physical attributes, such as disabilities. A legal scheme that
asks judges and juries to separate “good” physical attributes from “bad”
ones is problematic, especially when the physical attributes in question
are commonly viewed as disabilities. When judges and juries are forced
to speculate about the future consequences of physical conditions that
most of them have never experienced, they are likely to rely upon longestablished social stereotypes that disability is inherently tragic. This can
lead to wrong results and, equally disturbing, reinforcement of negative
views about disability and the competence of parents with disabilities.
But there is also a more subtle problem with the debate over genetic
intervention when it comes to disability. Commentators tend to use
terms such as “diminishment,” “untherapeutic,” and “defect” without
explaining how a decision maker like a judge or jury could realistically
and objectively determine which physical attributes fall into these
categories. The result of this ambiguity is that the debate forever hangs
in the air, awaiting the moment when a decision maker will tell us what
kinds of genetic interventions are harmful and which ones are neutral or
beneficial. No one points to a particular disability as being uniformly
harmful. Yet the debate continues to rely on the assumption that there
remains some terrible, albeit unidentified, threat of parents harming
children by favoring attributes associated with disability. Indeed, given
how few parents with disabilities actively seek to have children who
share their disability, this threat, if there is any, is hardly worthy of
alarm. Deconstructing the role of disability in this debate provides
insights into the unspoken cultural and moral assumptions embedded in

Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 317, 330.
See id. at 299. This Article primarily responds to the arguments made in that
symposium and expands upon the issues that have received less attention.
17
Id. at 310–12.
18
Id. at 339–41.
15
16
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arguments about the intersection between genetic intervention, physical
difference, and parenthood.
Part II of this Article gives a general background of the current and
emerging technologies for choosing the genetic makeup of a child, the
parties who control and influence genetic decisions, and the existing
legal doctrines that might be evoked if a child sought to hold her parents
liable in tort for genetic intervention. Part II.B through Part II.C then
summarizes Smolensky’s proposal to expand tort liability and identifies
some of the questions left open by Smolensky and her commentators.
Part III reexamines the policy reasons that have been suggested in
support of parental tort liability for genetic interventions. Although
there may be good reason to prohibit genetic intervention generally,
there is no solid basis for prohibiting genetic intervention only when
parents are seeking to give their child socially disfavored attributes.
Moreover, it appears that there is no great threat of parents using genetic
intervention to choose attributes that are ultimately harmful to children.
Part IV provides a critique of Smolensky’s proposal. Judges and juries
are unlikely to be able to properly determine the consequences of genetic
decisions in favor of disability. Indeed, holding parents liable for
negative social views about disability only serves to legitimate those
views. The final section offers some thoughts on why disability has been
a focal point in the debate over genetic intervention, ultimately
concluding that parents who show an appreciation for genetic diversity
should not be threatened with tort liability but rather should be given
the benefit of the doubt.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Technologies and the Gate-Keepers
There are two general types of artificial reproductive technology at
issue in this debate—one that currently exists in some forms and one that
scientists expect to develop in the coming years. The first technology,
genetic testing, is widely used to determine the genetic propensities of an
embryo or fetus.19 Often, parents who are not using in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”) and who are predisposed to an unwanted genetic trait use
genetic testing to determine whether to continue a pregnancy.20 Wide
use of genetic testing has already changed the make-up of society:
today, fewer children are born with Down syndrome, a result believed to
19
Angela M. Hannemann, A New Routine: Assisting Patients in Responding to Prenatal
Diagnosis, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 337, 337–38 (2006); Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents’ Freedom to
Have Children With Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 775–76.
20
Hannemann, supra note 19, at 337–38; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 775–76.
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be caused by a growing number of parents aborting fetuses that have
tested positive for the genotypes associated with Down syndrome.21
Parents who are using IVF to become pregnant may use PGD to help
them decide which embryos to implant and which ones to discard.22
Currently, PGD can be used to test for genotypes of a number of genetic
conditions, including Down syndrome and susceptibility to some
cancers.23 In the United States, parents are free to screen embryos using
PGD and select embryos that have the parents’ desired characteristics.24
Indeed, fertility clinics routinely use PGD to help parents select embryos
with the parents’ preferred genetic attributes.25
In the vast majority of cases, parents use genetic testing to avoid
having a child who has attributes associated with disability.26 As Lois
Shepherd notes, the practice of genetic testing itself suggests to parents
that they should take some action based on the results—and usually that
means not bringing a child with genetic differences to term.27 A number
of scholars have also shown that doctors and genetic counselors, whom
parents rely upon to describe the consequences of genetic conditions,
tend to emphasize the negative effects of genetic differences and thereby
encourage parents to avoid bringing a child with such characteristics to
term.28 This general bias among healthcare providers, when combined
with social pressure to have a “normal” child, makes parents hesitant to
have a child who has socially disfavored genetic traits.29
Physicians not only serve as would-be experts on the consequences
of genetic conditions, they also act as discretionary gatekeepers to
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”). Fertility clinics routinely
screen patients and may refuse fertility services when they believe that
the parents are unfit or that such services are not in the best interests of

21
Hannemann, supra note 19, at 338–39 (“[C]urrently about 80% of fetuses diagnosed
with Down Syndrome through prenatal tests are aborted.”).
22
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 40–41; Pham, supra note 8, at 134 & nn.11–14.
23
Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 567 n.2 (2007).
24
In the UK, by contrast, parents are prohibited from implanting an embryo known to
have genes for “a serious condition,” including genetic deafness. DAVIS, supra note 8, at
86–87.
25
Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing of Embryos: Practices and Perspectives of U.S. In
Vitro Fertilization Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY, May 2008, at 1055–57, available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GeneticTestingofEmbryos.pdf.
26
Shepherd, supra note 19, at 777–79.
27
Id.
28
Id.; see also Cara Dunne & Catherine Warren, Lethal Autonomy: The Malfunction of the
Informed Consent Mechanism Within the Context of Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Variants, 14
ISSUES L. & MED. 165, 191–93 (1998).
29
Shepherd, supra note 19, at 777–79.
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the future child.30 In the United States, “patient screening is conducted
in a haphazard manner, based on criteria fashioned by individual
providers that may or may not conform to the voluntary codes of
professional organizations.”31 A number of ART physicians have stated
openly that they would refuse to use PGD to help parents select a child
with genetic deafness or achondroplasia.32 Parents seeking to use PGD
to select for an embryo with the genotypes for attributes associated with
disability are likely to find that they must forum-shop to find a fertility
clinic that will work with them.
Despite these barriers to using PGD to select an embryo with socially
disfavored physical traits, there is a small number of reported cases of
parents using PGD to ensure that their child has traits associated with
disability. In 1995, one couple used PGD to select for a child with
achondroplasia.33 In a 2006 survey of 186 fertility clinics, three percent of
clinics reported that they had used PGD to help parents select an embryo
that had attributes associated with disability.34 The survey, however, did
not define “disability,”35 and some have questioned whether the
reported results are accurate.36 In any case, there appears to be an
interest among a small group of parents in having children with physical
features associated with disability, in particular, features associated with
short stature and genetic deafness.37

30
Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Disabling Dreams of Parenthood: The Fertility Industry, AntiDiscrimination, and Parents With Disabilities, 27 LAW. & INEQ. 311, 311–12 (2009).
31
Id. at 319.
32
Lindsey Tanner, Some Ponder “Designer” Babies With Mom or Dad’s Defective Genes, USA
TODAY (Dec. 21, 2006, 3:09 PM ET), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/
genetics/2006-12-21-designer-disability_x.htm; Sarah-Kate Templeton, Deaf Demand Right
to Designer Deaf Children, SUNDAY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece. The extent to which physicians may refuse
treatment based on their personal values, as opposed to based on the welfare of the patient
or child, is subject to considerable debate. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of
Conscience: Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Issues, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 42−43
(2008) (discussing the controversy over conscience-based refusals by healthcare
professionals asked to provide emergency contraceptives).
33
Faye Flam, Designing the Family Tree a Road to Eugenics?, BUFFALO NEWS, June 25, 1995,
at F7. Furthermore, a deaf couple has also utilized artificial insemination to have a deaf
child by choosing a sperm donor who had a family history of deafness. Merle Spriggs,
Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 283 (2002).
34
Baruch et al., supra note 25, at 1054.
35
See Johns Hopkins Univ. Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:
Practices and Attitudes of Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y
CTR. (April 2006), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/PGD_Survey_Questionnaire.pdf.
36
See Tanner, supra note 32.
37
See supra notes 25, 32−33 and accompanying text (noting that some parents seek to
have children with genetic deafness or achondroplasia).
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The second technology at issue—genetic intervention—is not yet
available. Genetic intervention involves manipulating the genetic
makeup of a fetus or embryo. Rather than simply testing an embryo for
genetic traits, genetic intervention would involve changing the DNA of
the embryo in an effort to produce the parents’ preferred
characteristics.38 Geneticists predict that genetic intervention is more
likely to work on gametes or embryos rather than children or adults.39
Some predict that genetic intervention will, at least in the early stages,
only be possible using an embryo prior to implantation.40
Currently in the United States, there are no laws directly addressing
whether parents may use genetic intervention to have a child with
particular characteristics.41 Thus, if no regulations are put in place, once
the technology becomes available, parents will be free to custom-design
their perfect baby. That baby might grow up to disagree with her
parents’ genetic choices. If a child had her DNA modified through
genetic intervention while she was still an embryo and later attempted to
sue her parents for changing her genetic makeup, courts would need to
cobble together common law and constitutional doctrines to decide
whether to permit the lawsuit to go forward. The next section considers
how courts might apply existing law to determine whether to permit a
child to bring a tort action against her parents based on the parents’ use
of genetic intervention.
B. Existing Law on Parental Liability for Prenatal Decisions42
A century ago, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, Oliver
Wendell Holmes asserted the general common law rule that a fetus is not
a separate legal person from its mother.43 For seventy-five years, courts
38
Dov Fox explains the following: “Genes do not by themselves determine human
physiology or psychology. Genes influence a person’s genotype, the instructions for
development and functioning in human beings. Genotype often diverges from phenotype,
a person’s manifested characteristics, as when genetically identical twins exhibit striking
disparities among a wide range of phenotypic traits.” Fox, supra note 23, at 568 n.3
(parenthetical omitted).
39
Id. at 573–74.
40
Id. at 567 n.2.
41
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 86–87. Outside of the U.S., regulation of PGD varies. Id.
42
Genetic intervention would probably not be a “prenatal” decision because it would
take place prior to implantation. However, courts would likely look for guidance in tort
cases involving prenatal injuries. In addition, courts may look to cases where claims of
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress were brought based on mishandling
of embryos. See, e.g., Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies: Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice
Without Physical Injury, 9 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 55, 58–59 nn.4–6 (2005).
43
138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884).
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followed the rule laid out in Dietrich, holding that a child could not bring
a tort action against another for injuries the child suffered in utero.44
Beginning with Bonbrest v. Kotz in 1946, however, courts began to move
away from the traditional rule.45 Noting that a developed fetus can
survive independent of its mother, the Bonbrest court held that a viable
fetus is indeed a separate legal person who may bring a cause of action
for prenatal injuries.46 Following Bonbrest, courts in most jurisdictions
have held that a viable fetus—i.e., one capable of surviving outside the
womb—is a separate legal person from its mother.47 In addition, some
jurisdictions permit tort claims to be brought on behalf of non-viable
fetuses.48
Still, it is uncertain whether courts would treat an embryo as a
separate legal entity capable of suffering harms that could form the basis
of a tort action against a third party.49 Even if courts do give this kind of
legal status to pre-implantation embryos, it is unclear whether courts
would permit children to bring tort claims against their parents based on
genetic intervention that occurred when the child was an embryo. The
viability of a claim based on genetic intervention depends greatly on
how courts categorize genetic intervention. If genetic intervention is
treated as a form of negligent prenatal care or as an intentional tort to the
person, courts in some jurisdictions may permit the child to bring a tort
action against her parents. If, however, genetic intervention is treated as
a medical or reproductive decision, courts are very unlikely to allow
recovery.

Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of
Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537, 576 (2006)
[hereinafter Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection].
45
65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
46
Id. at 140.
47
Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America’s Criminalization of
Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer—A Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 389, 412 (2009) [hereinafter Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother].
48
Id.
49
Professor Ouellette effectively frames the question as follows: “Can a parent or
healthcare provider inflict a legally cognizable harm on an embryo before it is implanted,
when the same parent or provider could dispose of the embryo without penalty?” Alicia R.
Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky’s Call for Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 397 (2008) [hereinafter
Ouellette, Insult to Injury]; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)
(“[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.”).
44
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Parental Tort Immunity and the Right to Make Medical and
Reproductive Decisions

The doctrine of parental tort immunity has had an unsettled life in
most jurisdictions.50
This doctrine, which gave parents absolute
immunity from civil actions brought by their minor children, was
developed in three cases commonly referred to as “the great trilogy.”51
These foundational decisions gave various justifications for giving
parents immunity from claims by their children, including the state’s
interest in preserving family harmony and the need to protect parental
discretion and authority.52
Some states adopted the parental immunity doctrine wholesale
while others adopted parental immunity only in limited situations.53 A
handful of jurisdictions never adopted the doctrine.54 In 1963, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its earlier adoption of parental
immunity and abrogated the doctrine except in limited circumstances.55
Goller v. White began a “long-overdue landslide” of court decisions
restricting the scope of parental immunity.56
Today, parental tort immunity survives only in qualified forms in
those jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine.57 Some jurisdictions
maintain parental immunity except in cases “of abuse or intentional,
wanton acts” by parents.58 Other jurisdictions have excepted from
parental immunity injuries resulting from certain acts like driving or
business activities.59 A third group of jurisdictions follow the approach
taken by Wisconsin in Goller. Under the Goller test, parental tort
immunity is retained only in matters involving ordinary parental
discretion and authority. Parental tort immunity may be invoked only in
the following situations: “(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an
exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged
50
Irene Hansen Saba, Parental Immunity from Liability in Tort: Evolution of a Doctrine in
Tennessee, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (2006).
51
Id. at 835; Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the
Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1991); Benjamin Shmueli, Love and
the Law, Children Against Mothers and Fathers: Or, What’s Love Got to Do With It?, 17 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 131 (2010).
52
Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1163; Saba, supra note 50, at 837–38.
53
Saba, supra note 50, at 839–40.
54
Id. at 836–37; Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1162 n.12.
55
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963).
56
Saba, supra note 50, at 843 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS § 122 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]).
57
Only two states, Ohio and North Carolina, have abolished parental immunity
completely without replacing it with some form of parental privilege. Id. at 848.
58
Id. at 849 & n.95.
59
Id. at 849 & nn.96–97.
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negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental
services, and other care.”60
In negligence actions brought by children against their parents in
California, parental tort immunity has been replaced by the “ordinarily
reasonable and prudent parent” standard.61 A parent’s acts or omissions
will not result in liability if those acts conform to this standard.62 A
minority of states have followed California’s approach by adopting the
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent standard in place of parental
immunity.63
Finally, some courts follow the Restatement’s approach to childparent liability.64 The Restatement abolishes parental immunity but
provides that some activities are privileged because of the parent-child
relationship.65 The Restatement recognizes a privilege for parental
discipline and “[t]he intimacies of family life,” and suggests that liability
is warranted only when the parent’s conduct is “palpably
unreasonable.”66
Although courts have developed different tests for assessing the
limits of parental liability, there is at least some consensus that there is a
“continued need for parental authority, discipline, and discretion in
matters uniquely related to the home and family.”67 Indeed, courts
applying the different tests for parental liability have recognized that,
except in extreme cases, judges and juries should not second-guess the
social, cultural, economic, and philosophical factors that shape parental
Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (emphasis omitted).
62
Saba, supra note 50, at 849. It is unclear how, if at all, the reasonable parent standard
differs from the reasonable person standard. See Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 503
(Wash. 2008) (“[I]t should be noted that substituting ‘parent’ for ‘person’ is of little
consequence, as a judge or jury always is required to consider the status of the actor in
applying the reasonable person standard in a negligence case. Thus, the ‘reasonable
parent’ standard is, in fact, the ordinary negligence standard.”); Rooney & Rooney, supra
note 51, at 1174 (“[T]he difference between the two standards is purely semantic. The
question of what the reasonable and prudent person would do in similar circumstances is
equivalent to asking what the reasonable and prudent parent would do in similar
circumstances. The substitution of the word ‘parent’ for ‘person’ adds nothing new to the
question.”); Shmueli, supra note 51, at 153 (“This standard . . . label[ed] ‘the California
approach,’ test[s] whether the parent had acted the way an ‘ordinary and careful’ parent
would reasonably have acted towards his children in similar circumstances.”).
63
Zellmer, 188 P.3d at 502 (collecting cases).
64
Saba, supra note 50, at 850.
65
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(2) (1979) (“Repudiation of general tort
immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child
relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.”).
66
Id. at cmt. k.
67
Saba, supra note 50, at 854.
60
61
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discretion and authority.68 As one court notes, if there were no privilege
for parental discretion, “juries would feel free to express their
disapproval of what they consider to be unusual or inappropriate child
rearing practices by awarding damages to children whose parents’
conduct was only unconventional.”69
To the extent parental immunity survives, in some respects it runs
parallel to the constitutional right of parents to exercise discretion in
raising their children without state interference.70 “[T]he interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the
Supreme] Court.”71 So long as parents are capable of providing for their
children, the state will not question the parents’ ability to make the best
choices for their children.72 Thus, “courts are generally unwilling to
consider the child’s best interests when the desired intervention has the
support of even one licensed medical provider.”73
Parental discretion over medical decisions is, however, not
absolutely protected from state intervention. The state may intervene
where “it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or
safety of [a] child.”74 Thus, parents may not refuse their child life-saving
treatment.75 Drawing a proper line between parental discretion and
68
See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 49 (Ariz. 1995) (acknowledging the need
“to protect the right of parents to raise their children by their own methods and in
accordance with their own attitudes and beliefs”); Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 233 N.W.2d 46,
49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (displaying a court’s reluctance to “enable others, ignorant of a
case’s peculiar familial distinctions and bereft of any standards, to second-guess a parent’s
management of family affairs”); Foldi v. Jeffries, 440 A.2d 58, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (“[D]iscretionary judgments involving the adequacy of child care and supervision
can rarely be separated from the parents’ philosophical dispositions as to how the physical,
moral, emotional and intellectual growth of their children can best be promoted.”); Zellmer,
188 P.3d at 503 (“Subjecting parents to liability for negligent supervision inevitably allows
judges and juries to supplant their own views for the parent’s individual child-rearing
philosophy.”); see also Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1169–70 (“A jury’s substitution of
its decision concerning the exercise of authority or the provision of necessities in place of
the parents’ decision would be based on only a brief view of the family situation and could
only be judged against, at best, loosely defined standards.”).
69
Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. 1994).
70
Saba, supra note 50, at 879 (“Parental immunity under the Broadwell standard extends
no further than the constitutional rights of the parent.”).
71
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
72
Id. at 68–69; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (asserting a “presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life’s difficult decisions”).
73
Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority Over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 969
(2010) [hereinafter Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority].
74
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 910 NE.2d 911, 918 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting
Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978)).
75
Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063.
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appropriate state intervention is particularly difficult when the child is
yet a fetus. Some courts have compelled pregnant women to undergo a
Caesarean section when the health of the fetus was deemed at risk.76
And in some states, a pregnant woman who engages in substance abuse
may be civilly committed to protect the health of the fetus.77 These
developments in the “fetal protection” movement have been criticized by
many as impinging upon the mother’s rights to privacy and selfdetermination.78
Related to parents’ discretion in raising their children is the right of
parents to make reproductive decisions free from unwarranted state
intrusion. The Supreme Court has asserted that parents have a
fundamental right to decide whether to reproduce.79 It is not clear,
however, how far this procreative liberty extends.80 Some have argued
that parents’ reproductive rights include the right to make genetic
decisions about what kind of child to conceive.81
Courts have not asserted that these constitutional parental rights
directly limit the scope of private lawsuits between children and parents.
Courts have, however, recognized that tort law must take into
consideration parents’ privacy rights and discretionary authority.82
Thus, the boundaries of private tort law are influenced, if not directly
constrained, by constitutional limits on interference in family affairs.
The policies underlying parental decision-making authority, in
combination with the surviving aspects of parental tort immunity,

76
See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D.
Fla. 1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding Cnty. Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); see also
Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection, supra note 44, at 568; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the
Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); cf. In
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a mother’s wish to avoid a Cesarean
section should be followed in “virtually all” cases).
77
Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection, supra note 44, at 566–67 & nn.37–38 (collecting
statutes).
78
E.g., id. at 564–70.
79
Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL
MED. 35, 45 (2000).
80
Id.
81
See id. (indicating that some commentators believe that the right of procreative liberty
is broad and most objections to the ARTs do not justify a ban or burden on their use); Fox,
supra note 23, at 569–70 (summarizing authorities arguing for a right to make genetic
decisions).
82
See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988) (detailing a mother’s
privacy and autonomy); Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)
(explaining that not all mothers are the same, as many have differing beliefs and resources);
see also sources cited supra note 68 (discussing cases favorable to the protection of parents’
rights).
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suggest a policy for giving some deference to the varying social and
cultural dynamics within families.
2.

Tort Liability of Parents for Prenatal Injuries

Since Holmes’s pronouncement in Dietrich, courts have struggled to
determine when a civil action may be brought based on prenatal injuries.
Today, every state permits a tort action against a third party for prenatal
injuries if the child is born alive.83 Most states allow a wrongful death
action on behalf of a viable fetus that dies prior to birth due to prenatal
injuries.84 A minority of states also permit a wrongful death action on
behalf of a non-viable fetus.85
Although there is some agreement that a child may bring a claim for
prenatal injuries against a third party, it is not clear that the same action
may be brought against the child’s mother.86 Cases in which the alleged
tortfeasor is the mother of the plaintiff are considerably rarer—and more
difficult. There are only six reported decisions addressing whether a
child may bring an action for negligence against its mother for prenatal
injuries suffered by the child.87 Three of these courts permitted such an
action88 and three refused to recognize the cause of action.89 There
appears to be no case law addressing whether a child may sue her
mother for intentionally inflicted prenatal injuries.90
The courts that have permitted negligence claims against a mother
for prenatal injuries have focused primarily on the abrogation of the
doctrine of parental tort immunity. In Grodin v. Grodin,91 the plaintiff
alleged that his mother negligently took tetracycline during her

Fentiman, Pursuing The Perfect Mother, supra note 47, at 411–12.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Presumably an action for prenatal injuries inflicted by the father would be treated the
same as injuries inflicted by a third party because fathers do not have the unique symbiotic
relationship with a fetus that mothers do during pregnancy. See, e.g., Chenault, 989 S.W.2d
at 475–76 (refusing to find a duty of a mother to her fetus because of “[t]he unique
symbiotic relationship between a mother and her unborn child” and noting that “[i]n no
other relationship is one so completely dependent upon another for life itself”).
87
See sources cited infra notes 88–89 (listing three cases permitting a cause of action for
prenatal injuries and three cases denying a cause of action for prenatal injuries).
88
See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank, 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Grodin v.
Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
89
See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d
260 (Mass. 2004); Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
90
Clearly, a child can sue her parent for intentional torts inflicted after birth. To the
extent courts permit claims based on prenatal negligence, they would most likely also
permit claims based on intentionally tortious prenatal conduct.
91
301 N.W.2d 869.
83
84
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pregnancy, causing plaintiff to develop discolored teeth. The Michigan
Court of Appeals held that the lawsuit could proceed so that the jury
could determine whether Mrs. Grodin’s actions fell within one of the
exceptions to Michigan’s abrogation of prenatal tort immunity.92 If
taking tetracycline was not a “reasonable exercise of parental discretion,”
Mrs. Grodin could be held liable for her son’s darkened teeth.93
Similarly in Bonte v. Bonte, a father brought an action against the
mother as a next friend of a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car
accident.94 He alleged negligence for failing to use reasonable care in
crossing a street and failing to use the designated crosswalk.95 The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire permitted the action to go forward.
Although recognizing “the unique relationship of the pregnant woman
to her fetus,” the court held that it was not “logical . . . to disallow [a]
child’s claim against the mother for negligent conduct that caused injury
to the child months, days, or mere hours before the child's birth.”96 This
principle was followed in National Casualty Co. v. Northern Trust Bank,
where the Florida Court of Appeals also held that the abrogation of
parental immunity allows for a child to bring a claim for prenatal
negligence against her mother.97
The courts that have rejected claims for prenatal injury by a child
against her mother have done so based in part on the problems inherent
in attempting to develop a fair standard for judging a mother’s prenatal
decisions. In Stallman v. Youngquist, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car accident could not sue her
mother for negligently driving.98 The court criticized the Grodin court’s
failure to recognize the unique relationship between a mother and fetus,
which is “unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff and
defendant.”99 Virtually every action of a pregnant mother as well as
some actions taken prior to conception, the court said, may affect the

Id. at 870.
Id. Michigan law provides an exception to the abrogation of parental immunity where
“the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the
child.” Id. The Grodin court read this exception to require a jury determination of whether
the parent acted “reasonably” in exercising parental authority. Id. at 871. This approach,
however, seems to render the exception meaningless. If a parent’s act is “reasonable” then
there is no basis for a claim of negligence in the first place, and thus no need to inquire into
whether parental immunity applies to the situation. Id.
94
616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 466.
97
807 So. 2d 86, 87–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
98
531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988).
99
Id. at 360.
92
93
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health of a fetus.100 The court declined to recognize a duty that would
make mothers the guarantors of the health of their unborn children:
“Judicial scrutiny into the day-to-day lives of pregnant women would
involve an unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of
the citizens of this State.”101
In Chenault v. Huie, the Texas Court of Appeals followed Stallman
and refused to permit a cause of action by a child injured by her mother’s
negligent alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy.102 The court further
elaborated on the problems that arise from attempting to define a duty of
a mother to her unborn child: “[R]eligious beliefs, social and economic
status, age, maturity, and educational level differ significantly among
women. Each of these factors may affect a woman’s decisions with
respect to prenatal care.”103 The court refused plaintiff’s proposal that
the court adopt a modified “reasonable person” standard in assessing
prenatal conduct: “The ‘reasonable person’ standard . . . is simply not
designed to apply to matters involving intimate, private, and personal
decisions.”104 Because prenatal decisions “involve applying inherently
subjective values,” jurors would inevitably “apply their own personal
views to the facts presented resulting in verdicts that would be varied
and, in all probability, inconsistent and unpredictable.”105 The court
condemned maternal alcohol and drug use during pregnancy, but
expressed doubt that tort liability was the appropriate way to discourage
such conduct.106
In the most recent case involving a claim against a mother for
prenatal injuries, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Remy v.
McDonald held that a child could not bring a claim against her mother for
prenatal negligence.107 The court criticized the Grodin, Bonte, and
National Casualty courts for “fail[ing] to address the collateral social and
other impacts of the imposition of a legal (as opposed to a moral)
obligation that would hold a pregnant woman to a standard of care
towards her unborn child.”108 The court thus declined to find a legal
duty of a mother to her unborn child, noting that permitting such claim

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 359.
Id. at 361.
989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999).
Id. at 477.
Id. For other criticism of the reasonably prudent parent standard, see supra note 62.
Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478.
Id.
801 N.E.2d 260, 262 (Mass. 2004).
Id. at 265.
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“could have profound social implications and far reaching unforeseen
legal consequences.”109
3.

Where Does Genetic Intervention Fit in?

The prenatal negligence cases raise some of the same issues that
would be raised by a case in which a child sued her parents for using
genetic intervention to give the child particular traits. Both kinds of
cases seek to prevent acts that could result in injury to the later-born
child, and courts would need to find some appropriate objective measure
by which to judge parental acts.110 This is a difficult task given the
diversity of viewpoints and circumstances surrounding conception and
prenatal care.
Despite these common issues, however, negligence law is an
uncomfortable fit for claims based on genetic intervention. Unless
genetic engineering becomes so common and routine that it occurs by
default, genetic intervention will most certainly be considered an
intentional act. Parents would not fall into genetic intervention through
carelessness; rather, parents would intentionally engage in genetic
intervention with specific objectives. If the decision to engage in genetic
intervention is irresponsible or foolish, the harm that comes from
intervention is the result of a bad calculation of what will help the
child—rather than a failure to take some precaution.111 A parent’s
decision to use genetic intervention is much more deliberate than, for
example, a pregnant mother’s failure to anticipate the consequences of
taking a medication (as in Grodin)112 or a mother’s failure to use the
designated crosswalk (as in Stallman).113 Mrs. Grodin did not ingest
tetracycline for the purpose of giving her son discolored teeth any more
Id. at 264.
On the other hand, some of the prenatal negligence cases are strongly influenced by
the unique symbiotic relationship between a mother and her fetus. See, e.g., Chenault, 989
S.W.2d at 475–76. Parents who engage in genetic intervention outside the womb do not
have such a relationship with an embryo at the time of the intervention. Arguably, in this
respect genetic intervention cases are easier to resolve because they do not raise questions
about the mother’s right to privacy and self-determination. See Smolensky, Genetic
Interventions, supra note 9, at 323 (arguing that the rationales that led courts to find no duty
in prenatal negligence cases do not support the same rule in cases of genetic intervention).
111
Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (characterizing
negligence as a failure to take adequate precautions in light of probable risks);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001)
(stating that a determination of negligence includes considering “the burden that would be
borne by the person and others if the person takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the
possibility of harm”).
112
See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
113
See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
109
110
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than the mother in Stallman crossed the street carelessly in order to harm
her fetus. Thus, even courts that do find parents owe a duty to their
unborn child are unlikely to characterize the intentional act of genetic
intervention as a form of negligence.
Battery law supplies a slightly better fit for a claim based on genetic
intervention. As an intentional tort, battery corresponds with the
intentional nature of genetic intervention. Battery is generally defined as
an intentional, harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.114
Smolensky explains that genetic intervention would require multiple
intentional contacts with the embryo: “In the preimplantation context,
there is intent to make contact with the embryo when it is formed in the
petri dish, when it is manipulated or has cells removed, and when it is
implanted in the womb.”115 In most jurisdictions, an intentional contact
is a battery, even if the tortfeasor intended no harm or offense, so long as
the tortfeasor intended to make contact with another’s “person.”116
Under this rule, parents who engage in genetic intervention may be
found to have the necessary intent for battery despite the fact they did
not intend the intervention to harm or offend the child.
Determining whether a genetic intervention is “harmful or
offensive” would require a leap of imagination. An embryo has no
physical abilities to lose; it only has certain tendencies and potentials.
Likewise, an embryo is incapable of being offended or expressing
consent. Lacking direct evidence, courts could leave it to juries to
determine, based on the juror’s experience with the physical attributes
chosen by the parents, whether the particular genetic intervention was
harmful or offensive.
Given that this inquiry requires speculation about future abilities of
children as well as value-laden decisions about what kinds of things are
beneficial in life, courts may choose to defer to parental discretion. In
some jurisdictions, parents could invoke parental tort immunity by
claiming that genetic intervention falls within discretionary provision of
medical services. Even outside the doctrine of parental immunity, courts
may defer to parents’ decisions to use genetic intervention based on the
general rule that a minor is presumed to consent to most medical
procedures authorized by the parents.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1979).
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319.
116
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13; Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of
Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2006). There may be some arguments that an
embryo is not a “person” prior to implantation because at that point embryos may legally
be discarded. See supra note 49.
114
115
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In order to justify court interference with parental rights, courts
would need a means for determining when genetic intervention
constitutes a significant, legally cognizable harm to the child. The next
section describes Smolensky’s proposal for expanding tort liability by
measuring harm by the anticipated future consequences of the genetic
traits imposed upon the child.
C. Arguments for Expanding Tort Liability
1.

The “Open Future” Test for Harm

In her article, Creating Children with Disabilities, Smolensky argues
that parents “should be liable to their children in tort where they directly
intervene in the child’s DNA, and consequently cause that child to suffer
a disability that limits the child’s right to an open future.”117 Citing
anecdotal evidence that some parents with certain disabilities have
sought to have children who share the parents’ disability, Smolensky
concludes that there is a real threat that parents may attempt to use
intervention to harm their future children.118
Smolensky starts from the position that parents should be permitted
to use technological advances in artificial reproductive technologies to
make procreative decisions except when those decisions are likely to
cause harm to the later-born child.119 “The key question then becomes,”
Smolensky asserts, “which modified phenotypes constitute legally
cognizable harms?”120 In the context of genetic intervention, Smolensky
argues, harm should be assumed when parents choose to give their child
a trait that “unreasonably limit[s] the life plans available to their
child.”121 First, Smolensky appears to advocate a shift in the burden of
proof when a parent has used genetic intervention to conceive a child
Adopting the approach of John Robertson,
with a disability.122
Smolensky argues that
if parents purposefully produce a child with fewer
capabilities, or less health, when they could produce a
more healthful or capable child, there [should be] a
presumption of harm unless it can be shown by a
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 299.
Id. at 304 (“[D]espite the general expectation that parents will make beneficial genetic
choices for their future children, this may not always be the case. In fact, some evidence
suggests that parental preferences for arguably harmful interventions are real.”).
119
Id. at 307–08 (adopting the modern traditionalist view of procreative liberty).
120
Id. at 301.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 308–09.
117
118

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/6

Fordham: Disabilitiy and Designer Babies

2011]

Disability and Designer Babies

1493

preponderance of the evidence that such children are at
least as well-off as their more healthful or capable
alternate selves.123
Second, Smolensky argues for adoption of the moral rights approach
of Joel Feinberg to provide a test for harm.124 Under this approach,
courts would assume a legally cognizable harm has been inflicted if the
parents’ choice infringes upon the child’s “right to an open future.”125
Under the open future test, Smolensky believes that “most, if not all,
traits defined as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) should be considered legally cognizable injuries.”126
Therefore, Smolensky argues in favor of liability under both
intentional and negligence tort theories.127 She asserts that genetic
intervention could be treated as a battery because the process of
intervention involves multiple contacts with the body of the embryo.
Because genetic intervention is done without the consent of the future
child, Smolensky argues that courts should use an objective standard to
determine whether the particular intervention is harmful or offensive.128
She concludes that
[u]nder an objective standard of offense the creation of
genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia are
almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable
sense of personal dignity. This is illustrated by the fact
that most people would be offended if they were

Id. at 309 (citing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994)).
124
Id. at 309–10 (citing Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 126 (William Aiken &
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980)).
125
Id.
126
Kirstin Rabe Smolensky, Parental Tort Liability for Direct Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions: Technological Harms, the Social Model of Disability, and Questions of Identity, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 411, 418 (2008) [hereinafter Smolensky, Technological Harms].
127
Despite her assertion that disability prevents children from having an open future,
Smolensky supports tort liability only when the parents have physically intervened in their
child’s genetic makeup. Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 301. Parents who
use PGD to determine which embryo to implant would not be liable, however, because the
child cannot be said to have suffered harm because the child would not have existed if the
parents had chosen a different embryo. Id. at 331–32 (applying Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity
Problem); see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–79 (1987).
128
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–21.
123
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unconscious and another person removed their sense of
hearing.129
Smolensky argues that courts could reach this same conclusion under the
open future approach.130
With respect to negligence, Smolensky argues that parents have “a
duty to act as . . . reasonably prudent parent[s] when making
preimplantation genetic choices.”131 Juries would decide whether
parents have violated this duty based upon the circumstances
surrounding the parents’ decision to use genetic intervention.132
Presumably, this duty is breached when parents choose to give their
child traits that violate the child’s right to an open future.133
Smolensky argues that neither parental tort immunity nor
constitutional parental rights should insulate parents from liability for
selecting attributes that violate a child’s right to an open future.134 This is
so, she says, because parental rights do not extend to actions that are
harmful or not in the best interests of the child.135 Parental tort immunity

129
Id. at 319–20. In her response, Smolensky clarifies that it is not the mere experience of
these disabilities that is “offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity,” but rather the
creation of these genetic traits that she believes is objectively offensive. Smolensky,
Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 421–22. It is not clear, how, if it all, this distinction
matters. After all, if choosing a particular trait is offensive, it must be so because the trait is
in some way offensive or harmful. Otherwise, choosing any trait would be offensive—a
position Smolensky clearly disputes.
Smolensky’s illustration makes two dangerous assumptions. First, it assumes that
what is “reasonable” is whatever seems normal to “most people.” Unusual and
unreasonable are entirely different inquiries. Second, it assumes that the offense
experienced has something to do with the new physical attribute (deafness) rather than the
change in physical traits imposed without consent. Many persons with dark skin would be
offended if someone bleached their skin while they were unconscious, but that is not
because light skin offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. Indeed, we cannot
assume that light skin offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity even if “most people”
have dark skin and “most people” would be offended by having their skin bleached
without consent. The confusion with respect to consent arguments is discussed in Part
III.B.
130
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–20.
131
Id. at 323; see also supra note 62 and text accompanying note 104 (providing a criticism
of the reasonably prudent parent standard).
132
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 323 n.137.
133
Id. at 344–45.
134
Id. at 314–17, 328–30.
135
Id. at 328–30. This argument, of course, assumes that courts are able to effectively and
accurately determine whether the child has suffered cognizable harm without unwarranted
intrusion into family affairs. But how could courts make such a determination if not by
reference to general stereotypes and social assumptions? The very purpose of parental tort
immunity and constitutional protection of parental decisions is to prevent the state from
interfering with family affairs except when clearly necessary to protect a child. If these
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should not apply because “genetic interventions that select for a
disability would result in reduced health and capabilities.”136 Smolensky
also concludes that “[w]here children might be harmed by their parents’
constitutionally protected decision making, the State should limit the
parents’ rights.”137
Although Smolensky raises important ethical and legal issues, her
proposal leaves a number of questions unanswered. Smolensky asserts
that there is a real threat of parents harming their children by
engineering characteristics associated with disability. But she also
admits that the two kinds of disability she discusses—deafness and
achondroplasia—are not necessarily harmful to children.138 Smolensky
would leave it to judges and juries to decide which characteristics
associated with disability are indeed harmful.139 Yet Smolensky never
addresses the question of whether judges and juries are better at
evaluating the effects of genetic intervention than parents. Nor does she
consider how her proposal would affect genetic diversity and public
perceptions of disability.
2.

Responses to Smolensky

Three scholars have responded directly to Smolensky’s call for
imposing liability on parents who use genetic intervention to have a
child with physical traits associated with disability. Smolensky has
responded to these comments by clarifying some of her theories and
backing away from others. Next, this Article introduces the way two of
these responses recast the problem Smolensky posed.
a.

The Dangers of Genetic Intervention

Professor Jamie King writes in favor of Smolensky’s basic premise
that “children should be able to sue their parents for harmful

doctrines are only considered after the court has evaluated the parents’ decisions according
to the court’s standards, then these doctrines serve no purpose.
136
Id. at 317.
137
Id. at 329.
138
Smolensky’s position on this is not entirely clear. On one hand, she states that all
traits that qualify as disabilities under the ADA should be found to be cognizable harms.
Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418. On the other hand, she advocates a
case-by-case evaluation of the effects of the chosen attributes on the child. Smolensky,
Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340–41.
139
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 300 (“Given the specter of eugenics, it
may be best to have the tort system, rather than the government, determine which traits are
harmful.” (footnote omitted)).
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preimplantation genetic manipulations.”140 However, King argues that a
federal regulatory scheme would be more effective than tort liability.141
King finds the open future test for harm appropriate in the context of
genetic interventions, but she notes that at least some of the disabilities
that Feinberg assumes violate a child’s right to an open future are no
longer considered as damning as they once were.142 Given the changing
status of various disabilities, determining whether a child has suffered
harm “will require juries to make value judgments about which
disabilities are so severe as to violate the child’s right to an open
future.”143
Ultimately, King supports Smolensky’s assertion that parents should
be treated as owing a duty to their offspring to act as reasonably prudent
parents.144 King asserts, however, that this duty should not just apply to
decisions to produce a child with a disability but to “all ART choices
made prior to embryo transfer.”145 Thus, King promotes a balancing test,
in which the benefits of genetic intervention would be weighed against
the risks and harms.146 She argues that this balancing should not just
consider the merits of the genetic trait chosen by the parent, but also the
risks inherent in the process of genetic intervention and the potential
benefits to the child of sharing the same physical traits as the child’s
parents.147
Notably, King recognizes that in some situations a child might be
better off growing up with a disability than without one.148 In King’s
view, however, it will be a long time before those benefits outweigh the
inherent risks of genetic intervention.149 Nonetheless, King states, “[i]f
researchers eliminate the risks associated with embryonic gene therapy,
in some instances, a reasonable parent, considering all of the risks and

140
Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 377
(2008).
141
Id. at 392.
142
Id. at 387–88.
143
Id. at 384.
144
Id. at 392.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 388–89.
147
Id. at 387.
148
Id. at 389.
149
Id. at 387. King states the following:
Parents who wish to engage in direct genetic manipulation to produce
a child with a disabling trait should have a very hard time finding a
physician who would perform the procedure, and proving to a jury
that they did not intend to harm their child, or that they acted as
reasonably prudent parents.
Id.
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benefits, could find that her child may have a better life with the
disability than without.”150
b.

A Disability Rights Perspective

In response to Smolensky’s article, Professor Alicia R. Ouellette
explains what she calls a “disability rights perspective” of Smolensky’s
proposal.151 Although noting that she “often disagree[s] with the
reactionary response of some disability rights activists to perceived
slights,”152 Ouellette expresses concern that the open future approach
might offend persons with disabilities because it relies upon stigmatizing
assumptions about disability.153
Ouellette explains that the open future approach Smolensky adopts
from Feinberg assumes that disability is inherently harmful:
In his work, Feinberg unabashedly accepts as true the
myth of the tragedy of life with disability. He asserts
that a newborn child born with blindness, deafness, or
permanent paralysis has “[]impaired faculties that are
essential to the existence and advancement of any
ulterior interests.” He describes such conditions as “so
far below a reasonable minimum as to be inescapably
degrading and sordid.” He suggests that being born
with a disability “is not merely to have ‘bad luck.’ It is to
be dealt a card from a stacked deck in a transaction that
is not a ‘game’ so much as a swindle.”154
The view that disability is inherently tragic and limiting derives
from the traditional definition of disability by medical professionals as a
physiological flaw to be treated, cured, or condemned.155 This “medical
model” of disability has been repeatedly deconstructed and debunked

Id. at 388.
Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 398. Ouellette does not indicate whether
she agrees with this perspective; instead, she argues that this perspective must be
considered because “[n]ot only do people with disabilities have the most at stake in the
discussions, disability scholars are experts in identifying and preventing social oppression
of people with disabilities.” Id. at 399–400.
152
Id. at 399.
153
Id. at 402.
154
Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 98–99 (1984)).
155
Id. at 400; see also infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional
medical model of disability).
150
151
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by disability scholars.156 In place of the medical model of disability,
disability scholars have advanced a “social model” of disability that
corresponds with other minority perspectives.157 The social model of
disability recognizes that many (and sometimes all) of the limitations
that are associated with disability derive not from physical impairment
but from “[a]rchitectural, attitudinal, sensory, political, and economic
barriers.”158
Ouellette argues that Feinberg’s characterizations of disability “are
as inaccurate as they are demeaning.”159 She notes that empirical and
anecdotal evidence suggests that persons who have not experienced
disability “grossly underestimate the value of life with disability.”160 As
a result, Ouellette advocates a “disability-sensitive” approach that would
treat genetic intervention in favor of disability no differently than genetic
interventions that attempt to impose any kind of enhancement upon an
embryo.161 “[A] decision to choose disability is no different from a
decision to use other genetic enhancements to shape a future child for
nontherapeutic purposes.”162 Rather than “sorting among manufactured
phenotypes to determine which constitute legally cognizable harms,”
Ouellette argues that the law should “ask whether adding, deleting, or
modifying an embryo’s DNA to produce the parents’ desired genotype is
itself a legal wrong.”163 This approach, Ouellette asserts, avoids
offending the sensibilities of persons with disabilities and provides
redress for any child whose identity has been unnecessarily manipulated
through genetic intervention.164
By connecting the language of the open future approach to the
outdated medical model of disability, Ouellette makes significant
But
headway toward reorienting the discussion of disability.165
Ouellette’s focus on the possibility of offending persons with disabilities
does not, by itself, provide a persuasive argument against Smolensky’s

156
Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 400; see also infra note 178–86 and
accompanying text (explaining the shift from the traditional medical model of disability to
a social model of disability).
157
Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 401; see also infra note 184–87 and
accompanying text (discussing the adoption of a social model of disability).
158
Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 401.
159
Id. at 402.
160
Id. at 403.
161
Id. at 406.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 407.
164
Id. at 409.
165
Indeed, I agree with Ouellette’s ultimate conclusion that genetic intervention in favor
of disability be treated the same as any other attempt at genetic enhancement.
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proposal.166 To be sure, it is good to avoid using legal doctrines that
offend or belittle a portion of the population. This concern, however,
weighs lightly when the life of a child is at stake. Few would argue that
we should permit parents to harm their children simply because the
basis for liability does not acknowledge the perspective of one group.
Focusing on Ouellette’s critique of the medical model of disability,
Smolensky responds by arguing that even if disability is not inherently
limiting, the continuing existence of social and environmental barriers
for persons with disabilities warrants treating disability as a cognizable
Smolensky willingly disclaims Feinberg’s “offensive”
injury.167
characterization of life with a disability, but maintains that the open
future test remains a viable tool for measuring cognizable harm.168
What we are left with, then, are a number of line-drawing questions
that seem to depend upon how disability is characterized. Is there a real
threat of children being harmed by parents using genetic intervention in
favor of disability? Or should genetic intervention be treated as a harm
in itself? If we do attempt to identify when genetic intervention is
harmful, should we define the consequences of disability normatively or
descriptively? And who is best qualified to make determinations about
the advantages and disadvantages of socially disfavored physical traits?
III. TAKING A STEP BACK: POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. A Neglected Question
A compelling question underlies much of the debate over whether
parents should be held liable in tort for making genetic choices in favor
of disability: Why would a parent choose to give her child a disability?
Very little has been written in an attempt to answer this question.169
166
Ouellette also recognizes that the open future framework could “have the unintended
effect of reinforcing negative societal perceptions about disability in a way that further
marginalizes and alienates the disability community.” Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note
49, at 403.
167
Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418–21.
168
Id.
169
There are likely two reasons for the dearth of information about why some parents
might seek to give their child physical traits associated with disability. First, there are very
few parents who actively seek to have a child with disfavored physical characteristics. See
infra note 173 (showing statistics that only a relatively small portion of parents would
prefer to have a deaf child). Second, parents who are likely to select in favor of disability
do not speak openly because of the stigma associated with having a child with a disability.
See, e.g., Carina Dennis, Deaf by Design, 431 NATURE 894 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=1516 (quoting Carol Padden as saying,
“[d]eaf people know that it’s a very risky thing to say in public that you would consider
genetic testing to have a deaf child”). One exception to the general tendency to give short
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Although some commentators acknowledge that there may be
circumstances where disability is not a detriment, this perspective is
usually offered only to qualify the more general assumption that
disability is itself a kind of injury.170 As a result, parents who are willing
to take active measures to conceive a child with a disability are often
characterized as selfish, unreasonable, or politically radical.171
Two points must be emphasized at the outset. First, not all persons
with a particular disability would like to have a child with the same
disability, and even those who do might not be willing to use genetic
intervention to that end. Headlines like, “Deaf Demand Right to
Designer Deaf Children” suggest that all deaf persons would seek to
have a deaf child.172 Within the Deaf and disabled communities,
however, there are a variety of viewpoints on this issue, and apparently
only a small number of deaf or disabled parents say they would consider
using genetic testing to make sure their child is deaf.173
shrift to the psychological and cultural motives of parents with disabilities who seek to
have a disabled child is the analysis in Davis’s book. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90.
Although I disagree with Davis’s ultimate conclusion that fertility professionals should
refuse to assist Deaf parents in having a deaf child, she does attempt to analyze the diverse
motives of parents who want to have a deaf child. Id. at 82.
170
See, e.g., N. Levy, Deafness, Culture, and Choice, 28 J. MED. ETHICS, 284–85 (2002)
(discussing the current controversy on the parental choice of creating a deaf child);
Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418–20 (suggesting that most, if not all,
traits defined as disabilities under the ADA should be considered legally cognizable
injuries). Even Ouellette seems to fall into this presumption in titling her article “Insult to
Injury.” Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49. If the “insult” is the stigmatizing
language of the open future framework, the “injury,” it appears, is disability.
171
See, e.g., K.W. Anstey, Are Attempts to Have Impaired Children Justifiable?, 28 J. MED.
ETHICS 286, 286–88 (2002) (suggesting that parents seek to have a deaf child for political
reasons, a practice which takes them outside the “moral community”); Fox, supra note 23,
at 582 (suggesting parents who avoid socially disfavored physical traits “prefer not to
sacrifice their children on the altar of moral principle, or in support of a political cause,
even a very worthy one”); Levy, supra note 170, at 285 (arguing deaf parents seek to have
deaf children because of apparent misplaced fears caused by the parents’ own difficult
childhood); Karen E. Schiavone, Comment, Playing The Odds Or Playing God? Limiting
Parental Ability To Create Disabled Children Through Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 73 ALB.
L. REV. 283, 298 (2009) (“[P]arents who desire to have children with disabilities, and do so
intentionally, are doing so to satisfy their own autonomy and their own needs, without
respect to the future autonomy of the child in question.”).
172
Templeton, supra note 32.
173
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 79; Elizabeth A. Chen & Judith F. Schiffman, Attitudes Toward
Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis Among a Group of Individuals with Physical
Disabilities, 9 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 137, 137 (2000); Anna Middleton et al., Prenatal
Diagnosis for Inherited Deafness—What is the Potential Demand?, 10 J. GENETIC COUNSELING
121, 121 (2001) [hereinafter Middleton et al., What is the Potential Demand?] (providing
survey showing that only two percent of deaf persons surveyed would prefer to have a
deaf child and would consider terminating a pregnancy if prenatal testing showed they
were going to have a child with hearing impairments); Anna Middleton et al., Attitudes of
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Second, although discussions about genetic intervention refer
broadly to “disabilities” and “genetic defects,” there are really two kinds
of disability that we know parents with disabilities have expressed an
interest in selecting through genetic intervention—deafness and
achondroplasia.174 Although there may be other forms of disability that
are so connected with identity that parents would seek to engineer those
characteristics, there is no reason to assume that, if permitted, parents
would pay thousands of dollars to engineer children with all sorts of
disabilities and diseases. Hypothesizing about parents purposely
engineering the genes for breast cancer may be philosophically
interesting, but it provides little insight into the reality of why parents
might choose to use genetic intervention.175
There is nothing new about parents wanting to have children who
share the parents’ physical attributes. Adopting parents, for example,
often state a preference for children who share the parents’ racial
background.176 To the extent that parents with disabilities view their
disabilities as a part of their identities, it is not surprising that some
might want to have children who can share that identity. Most
nondisabled fertile couples can assume that their children will share
their physical attributes without any need for genetic intervention.
Because deafness is less common, and because parents with
achondroplasia face risks of having a child born with a fatal condition,
these parents cannot count on biology to pass these traits on to their
children.177

Deaf Adults Toward Genetic Testing for Hereditary Deafness, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1175,
1175 (1998) [hereinafter Middleton et al., Attitudes of Deaf Adults] (finding 16% of deaf
persons studied would consider using prenatal diagnosis and that of these, only 29%
would prefer to have a deaf child); cf. Jeanne Weir Brunger et al., Parental Attitudes Toward
Genetic Testing for Pediatric Deafness, 67 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1621, 1621 (2000) (presenting
study of parents who are not deaf but have deaf children that found that 96% of such
parents were in favor of genetic testing for deafness; however, none of these parents said
they would terminate a pregnancy upon learning that their child is going to be deaf).
174
There is, however, one report of non-disabled parents seeking to use PGD to have a
child with Down syndrome. Melissa Healy, Fertility’s New Frontier, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/21/health/he-pgd21.
175
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 320 (discussing consequences of
parents selecting genes associated with breast cancer).
176
See Twila L. Perry, Transracial Adoption and Gentrification: An Essay on Race, Power,
Family and Community, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 25, 30–34 (2006) (indicating that most
commonly, black children adopted from foster care are adopted by black women, not by
whites).
177
If both parents have achondroplasia, there is a 50% chance the child will be born with
achondroplasia and a 25% chance the child will be born with double-dominant syndrome,
which usually leads to death of the child at birth or shortly afterward. See Frequently Asked
Questions, supra note 11.
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There is a growing academic and cultural movement toward
questioning traditional assumptions about disability and identity. As
discussed above, over the past thirty years, disability scholars have
challenged the traditional portrayal of disability as a medical flaw. The
traditional medical model of disability178 assumed that disability is a
problem existing within the bodies of persons who are physically
different.179 Disability was treated as a physiological phenomenon that
must be cured or corrected,180 or in the language of genetics and
products liability, a “defect” to be avoided or ameliorated.181 Laboring
under the assumptions of the medical model, persons with disabilities
were expected to prove their moral and emotional validity by
“overcoming” their physical states and trying to approximate the lives of
Under the medical model, access and
nondisabled persons.182
employment rights were viewed as special treatment charitably
bestowed upon persons with inherently broken bodies.183
Following on the heels of the civil rights movement, the disability
rights movement rejected the medical model and adopted a minoritygroup model of disability.184 This social model of disability recognizes
that, for most people with disabilities, discrimination is a much greater
obstacle than any physical impairment.185 The social model of disability
thus calls for social and environmental changes to give persons with

178
I refer to the medical model in the past tense here because it is no longer the dominant
model for discussing disability. Unfortunately, however, the assumptions underlying the
medical model persist. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”:
The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181
(2008) (portraying the medical model of disability as a “Goldilocks” dilemma: people with
disabilities are either too disabled or not disabled enough).
179
Paul K. Longmore, The Second Phase: From Disability Rights to Disability Culture, in
WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 217 (2003); see also Wendy F.
Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 141, 146–47 (2005).
180
Hensel, supra note 179, at 146–47; Longmore, supra note 179, at 217.
181
See Shepherd supra note 19, at 764.
182
See, e.g., Longmore, supra note 179, at 232.
183
Id. at 219.
184
Id. at 218; Hensel, supra note 179, at 147; Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley
Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1351, 1356–57 (2008).
185
Hensel, supra note 179, at 147; Longmore, supra note 179, at 218. There are differing
conceptions of this social model. Some suggest that the obstacles associated with disability
are purely social and environmental, while others argue that these obstacles are partially
the result of the physical condition and partially the result of discrimination. Adam M.
Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2007).
Proponents of the social model generally agree, however, that the key to combating
discrimination and oppression is to demand social and environmental changes. Id. at 1267–
68.
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disabilities equal access to social and economic activities.186 The social
model of disability provided the basis for disability rights legislation,
like the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which introduced a
definition of disability that, in part, recognized the social construction of
disability.187
Rejection of the medical model did not just provide justification for
equal opportunities. It also allowed for persons with disabilities to take
control of their own identities.
Unfettered by the stigmatizing
assumptions of the medical model, persons with disabilities could
reevaluate majority values about physical difference.188 Drawing from
their own experience, some persons with disabilities have expressed
values quite different from nondisabled norms.189 As Professor Paul
Longmore explains, “They declare that they prize not self-sufficiency but
self-determination, not independence but interdependence, not
functional separateness but personal connection, not physical autonomy
but human community.”190 Longmore argues that these sublime values
are desperately needed in American society:
American culture is in the throes of an alarming and
dangerous moral and social crisis, a crisis of values. The
disability movement can advance a much-needed
perspective on this situation. It can offer a critique of the
hyperindividualistic majority norms institutionalized in
the medical model and at the heart of the contemporary
American crisis. That analysis needs to be made, not
just because majority values are impossible for people
with disabilities to match up to, but, as important,
because they have proved destructive for everyone,
disabled and nondisabled alike.191
This analysis suggests that those parents who select in favor of disability
may do so not to press a political agenda or strengthen a shrinking
population, but in an effort to perpetuate their own positive values and
Longmore, supra note 179, at 218; Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184, at 1357.
Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 59 (2000). The ADA’s expansive
definition of disability has been called “transformative” because it seeks to displace social
norms regarding what it means to be disabled. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: SocioLegal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 479–80 (2000). But see Samaha, supra note
185, at 1280 (claiming the social model of disability has no policy implications).
188
Longmore, supra note 179, at 221–22.
189
Id. at 222.
190
Id.
191
Id.
186
187
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culture. Sharon Duchesneau and Candace McCullough, a Deaf couple
who actively pursued having a deaf child, explain their perspective:
Our view . . . is that being deaf is a positive thing, with
many wonderful aspects. We don’t view being deaf
along the same lines as being blind or mentally retarded;
we see it as paralleling being Jewish or black. We don’t
see members of those minority groups wanting to
eliminate themselves.192
Parents often attempt to control their children’s options in an effort
to instill values and develop cultural understanding. Wealthy parents
sometimes deny their child access to family funds because they want the
child to develop a strong work ethic and know the joy of
accomplishment. Parents intentionally limit with whom their child
interacts, where the child goes to school, and what activities the child
pursues.
These restrictions may significantly limit the child’s
opportunities in life, but, as the parents recognize, they also create
opportunities to develop character and values.
Admittedly, limiting a child’s access to funds or activities is a far cry
from intentional manipulation of a child’s DNA.193 But all of these
limiting measures recognize the same principle: that one’s values and
identity are strongly influenced by one’s circumstances. Parents who
wish to use genetic intervention to change their child’s physical
characteristics are attempting to shape the child’s circumstances in life,
and thereby affect the child’s culture and character.
There are, of course, additional, sometimes related reasons why
parents with certain socially disfavored physical traits might want their
child to share those traits. Deaf parents might be concerned that they
will have difficulty maintaining a close relationship with their child if the
child does not share their culture and primary language.194 They may
Dominic Lawson, Of Course a Deaf Couple Want a Deaf Child, INDEP. (London), Mar. 11,
2008, at 40; see also Dolnick, supra note 10, at 38 (“So strong is the feeling of cultural
solidarity that many deaf parents cheer on discovering that their baby is deaf.”).
193
One distinction between these social measures and genetic intervention is cost. DAVIS,
supra note 8, at 36–39. Davis argues that the costs of directed procreation, whether by
genetic intervention or otherwise, is so high that it gives parents a sense of entitlement to a
child that meets the parents’ preconceived notions about what the child should do in life.
Id. This concern, however, cautions against permitting genetic intervention generally; it
does not suggest that parents should be prohibited from choosing only certain, socially
disfavored characteristics.
194
Id. at 77–78. Some have argued that preference should be given in adoption to parents
who share the same race and culture as the child. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006)
(establishing preference for adoption of Indian children by Indian parents); Perry, supra
192
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also be concerned that, as hearing parents increasingly use genetic
testing to avoid having a deaf child, the Deaf community will shrink,
and so too will understanding and appreciation of Deaf perspectives.195
To the extent that genetic intervention appears to be the wrong way
of perpetuating one’s values and identity, we must ask why this is so.
But if we claim that genetic intervention is wrongful only when used to
favor certain physical traits, we must ask what, if anything, makes those
kinds of genetic interventions different from genetic interventions in
favor of other physical traits. To start this inquiry, we must look to the
policies underlying arguments in favor of imposing tort liability on
parents who use genetic intervention to have a child with a disability.
B. Policies Underlying Arguments for Parental Tort Liability
The policies that are invoked in favor of parental tort liability fall
generally into two camps. First, some policies, if credited, support
prohibiting genetic intervention altogether or with limited exceptions.
These policies treat genetic intervention as wrongful in itself, regardless
of which physical attributes are the object of the intervention. There is
no need for a decision maker to define which physical attributes are
harmful and which are not. The very act of intervention is harmful.
The second camp consists of policies that may be invoked to support
prohibiting a certain kind of genetic intervention, that is, the use of
genetic intervention to give a child physical attributes that are believed
by some to be harmful, such as disabilities. Although these policies may
be appealing on their face, they provide no workable means of
determining when liability is appropriate. Moreover, it is doubtful that
there is a serious need to prohibit parents from using genetic
intervention to choose traits that are generally assumed to be harmful.
1.

Genetic Intervention as a Moral Wrong

Some oppose genetic interventions that result in disability based on
a general conviction that genetic intervention is wrong. This position
may derive from a belief that humans should not further tinker with the
natural course of conception and identity, that genetic engineering will
ultimately dilute positive social values, that intervention is
fundamentally unfair to the unborn child, or some other moral
note 176, at 30 (describing positions on transracial adoption). A similar concern expressed
by some Deaf persons is that hearing parents cannot properly raise a deaf child because
hearing parents are outsiders to Deaf culture. Dolnick, supra note 10, at 51; see also DAVIS,
supra note 8, at 76.
195
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 66–69.
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framework.196 Virtually every advancement in artificial reproductive
technology has been—at least initially—met with moral opposition.197
Over time, opposition has waned to each new technology.198 This does
not mean, of course, that we must assume that genetic intervention is
morally acceptable. It simply means that, for better or worse, views on
the subject are likely to change over time.
In any case, if genetic intervention is wrong in itself, it is wrong no
matter what traits are being chosen in the process. This remains true
even if we find a basis for minor exceptions to a general policy opposing
genetic intervention. The kind and scope of those exceptions vary
depending on the ethical framework motivating categorical opposition
to intervention. Thus, for example, if one opposes intervention because
it effects a change in the child without the child’s consent, then one will
likely hold that intervention is not tortious if the intervention is one we
assume any child would certainly consent to, such as an intervention
necessary to save the life of the child.199 If, however, one opposes
intervention because it alters a child’s identity, one will likely oppose
interventions that are deemed significant enough to affect identity, but
permit interventions that are deemed less substantial.200
Recognizing these kinds of exceptions is different—theoretically and
practically—from saying that parents should be held liable when they
choose certain physical traits (such as deafness or short stature) but not
others (such as blue eyes or fair skin). In the first situation, the
intervention is itself wrongful, but we are willing to excuse the wrong for
what we assume to be a greater good. Because this scenario starts from
the assumption that intervention is wrongful, the intervention will not be
permitted unless found to offer significant benefits to the child or society.
Under this framework, the decision maker must determine when the
danger of refraining from intervention is significant enough to warrant
departure from the moral grounds calling for prohibition of such
techniques.

See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 572–74.
Andrews & Elster, supra note 79, at 35–38. Smolensky makes it a point to note that
“disability advocates” have always opposed new fertility technologies. Smolensky, Genetic
Interventions, supra note 9, at 301. Although this may be true to some degree, disability
advocates are certainly not the only ones who approach new fertility technologies with a
degree of suspicion.
198
Andrews & Elster, supra note 79, at 35–38.
199
This approach arguably follows tort cases where consent is implied by operation of
law for medical assistance in emergencies. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 56,
at 117.
200
See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal
Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 350–59 (2008); Fox, supra note 23, at 594–95.
196
197
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In the second scenario, intervention is not considered wrongful in
itself, so any intervention is permissible so long as it does not do legally
cognizable harm.201 Under this framework, the decision maker is not
determining whether to avoid some catastrophe but rather guessing at
the consequences different physical traits might have on future children.
As discussed below, this is a much more complicated and difficult
decision because it requires sorting through the multifarious advantages
and disadvantages that each physical trait might have on a child who is
not yet born.
There is confusion in this area because some of the rationales given
to support categorical opposition to genetic intervention do not quite fit.
For example, some suggest that intervention is wrongful, in part,
because it is done without the consent of the child.202 The problem,
however, is that no child ever has a say in choosing her genetic makeup
regardless of whether genetic intervention is used.203 Alternatively, even
if we assume that there is some form of consent lacking in genetic
intervention, a child would be hard-pressed to prove that, had she been
given a choice at some metaphysical moment before her genes were
chosen, she would have rejected the physical traits the parents preferred.
The most a child could do is point to evidence that people generally
disfavor the physical attribute chosen by the parent and argue, by
extension, that she would have rejected the physical trait, as well.
Thus, in the context of genetic intervention, consent arguments have
less to do with the autonomy of the child and more to do with denying
the will of nature or the generalized assumptions of society. This is an
important distinction. It is one thing to say a person should have an
opportunity to express or deny consent to medical procedures. It is quite
another to say that unborn children have the right to be born with certain
attributes that are socially favored. The latter argument is not about
consent but rather an assertion that some physical traits are intrinsically
better than others.204
Consent aside, it is possible that there are very good policy reasons
to oppose genetic intervention categorically. As King points out, genetic
intervention
could
have
unanticipated
negative
physical

201
This framework is referred to as the modern traditionalist approach. See Smolensky,
Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 308 (indicating that modern traditionalists view
reproductive choice as a basic freedom that exists so long as it aids in successful
reproduction and does not cause direct harm to society or others).
202
E.g., id. at 319.
203
For example, I never had the opportunity to choose blue eyes and a muscular build,
and this has nothing to do with whether my parents engaged in genetic intervention.
204
See supra Part III.A (discussing problems with this assertion).
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consequences.205 Additionally, Dov Fox argues that, if left unregulated,
genetic engineering of children would “undermine civic compassion by
entrenching perceptions of human control over individual identity and
social advantage.”206 These rationales do not call for sorting through the
advantages and disadvantages of different physical traits or for
presuming disfavored physical traits constitute cognizable harms. If
anything, these policies call for a general prohibition with exceptions for
unusual situations.
2.

Concern that Children May Be Harmed

There are some parents who knowingly or recklessly place their
children in danger. Some mothers use illegal drugs during pregnancy.
Some parents neglect their children. Other parents engage in abuse. It
appears, however, there is little cause for concern that parents will use
genetic intervention to give their child traits that parents know to be
detrimental to the child. Parents who go to the expense of using genetic
intervention to choose a trait for their child will likely do so believing
that the trait will benefit the child.207
Good intentions, however, do not always lead to good results. Thus,
a third potential reason for holding parents who choose disfavored
physical traits through genetic intervention liable is that children might
suffer harm as a result of the chosen physical trait. Tort law generally
seeks to recompense persons who suffer harms unnecessarily; thus, if
disability is a harm, then it might make sense to hold parents who
impose such a trait on their child liable.208 Implicit in this policy
justification is an assumption that parents will sometimes make bad
decisions when choosing physical traits and the expense of those
decisions should be borne by the parents.
But determining what will be harmful or beneficial for a child, or
even what will limit or expand life opportunities for a child, is no simple
task. As King notes, a child born deaf might face challenges in
communicating with those who are not deaf, but the child may also
benefit from being a part of the Deaf community, or if the parents are
King, supra note 140, at 381.
Fox, supra note 23, at 619.
207
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319. There certainly may be
exceptions, such as parents who try to serve their own interests in reckless disregard for the
child. The possibility of this sort of recklessness, however, does not call for questioning all
parental decisions in favor of disability. Rather, it calls for enforcing existing criminal and
civil laws against persons who intentionally or recklessly cause emotional distress. See Ann
M. Haralambie, Children’s Domestic Tort Claims, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 525 (2006).
208
See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 53–56 (discussing the role of tort law in reproductive
technology).
205
206
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themselves deaf, from sharing the physical and cultural attributes of her
Whether one finds greater value in communication
parents.209
opportunities or in familial and cultural bonding depends on one’s
culture and experiences, and it would be difficult to say that one set of
values is right while the other wrong. Indeed, the comparison of harms
and benefits is more likely to reflect social preferences than any inherent
quality of the physical trait.210
The difficulty of balancing harms and benefits persists regardless of
whether the physical traits in question are ones commonly viewed as
disabilities. Giving a child six fingers on each hand might be seen as an
enhancement to parents who dream of their child being a pianist;211 but
to others, this may seem a cruel disfigurement that will severely limit
social opportunities. So too, parents might attempt to bless their child
with the physical prowess of Michael Jordan but then damn the child
with severe pressure to succeed as an athlete. A child engineered with
exceptional intelligence may suffer socially in her youth. And there are
myriad non-genetic interventions, such as circumcision and inoculations,
that are just as permanent as genetic decisions and could be found to
harm or benefit the child depending on the social situation, cultural
mores, and later developments. Some of these parental decisions may be
harmful in some respect, but few people would find judicial intervention
and parental liability are necessary to test all of these early parental
decisions.212
This is not to say that the question of harm is always too speculative
to reach. The point is, rather, that the decision about whether a physical
trait is a harm or a benefit should not be made based upon
overgeneralizations that having more physical ability is always better
than having less, that some physical traits are inherently damning, or
that everyone is better off looking like the majority of folks we see on
television. There is value in the broad swath of human possibilities, even
if some of those are misunderstood by many. When the physical trait
chosen by the parents is not one that most people have experienced or

See King, supra note 140, at 389 (providing examples of the potential benefits of being
born deaf). There may very well be myriad other benefits of being deaf.
210
See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the social benefit of a trait should not be the
primary measure of its value).
211
See GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Co. 1997).
212
Smolensky admits that parents can harm their children in many ways, aside from
genetic intervention, and still avoid civil or criminal liability. Smolensky, Genetic
Intervention, supra note 9, at 341–42. She argues that parental liability for genetic
interventions is appropriate, however, because genetic changes are permanent and parental
misconduct can be proven more readily than other more subtle parental choices. See id. at
342.
209
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can reasonably understand, we must be careful that the decision about
harm is not based upon social stereotypes and cultural assumptions. If
people do not accurately perceive the nature of the challenges and
opportunities faced by a person with a particular physical trait, it would
be a mistake to give juries the final word on whether that trait is a harm
or a benefit.
3.

The Costs of Disability on Society

A third policy that has been asserted in support of parental tort
liability is that persons with disabilities impose costs on the society in
which they live. If parents who use genetic intervention in favor of
disability were subject to tort liability, perhaps fewer parents would use
genetic intervention for that purpose. This might decrease the number of
children with disabilities and free up funds that would otherwise be
needed to support such children.
This rationale assumes that children with disabilities are more
expensive than others.213 Although this may be true with regard to some
disabilities, the two disabilities that have been potential candidates for
genetic intervention—deafness and short stature—are not particularly
costly. Persons who are deaf or of short stature (or both) generally live
independently and without high medical costs.214 Their limitations
derive more from prejudices and environmental barriers than any
physical limitations.215 Although it is possible that parents might use
genetic intervention to have children with other kinds of socially
disfavored physical characteristics, it is unlikely parents would use
genetic intervention to choose particularly expensive traits because the
parents will be initially responsible for the costs.

213
This policy also relies upon the implied assumption that society generally would be
better off with fewer persons with disabilities and more resources. It is a mistake, however,
to assume that persons with disabilities cost more than they are worth. Indeed, what little
research there is on the subject—focusing on the utility of providing reasonable
accommodations to employ persons with disabilities—suggests that the benefits of having
such persons in the workplace far outweigh the costs. Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184,
at 1376.
214
See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 47 (explaining that deaf people live independently and also
refuting the social costs argument); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11 (explaining
that persons of short stature generally have average life spans and live independently).
215
See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (describing the social model of
disability).
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C. The Scope of the “Problem”
Two observations place the policies supporting parental liability in
context. First, neither Smolensky nor her commentators appear to claim
that giving a child physical attributes such as deafness or short stature
always harms the child.216 It may very well be that children whose
parents give them these physical traits do not suffer a cognizable harm,
even under the open future test.
Second, as Smolensky admits, there is not likely to be a great number
of parents who are interested in giving their child a trait that is
associated with disability.217 This should come as no surprise. The costs
of genetic engineering will be high, especially in the early years.
Moreover, the social pressure to have a “normal” baby, that is, one who
has attributes that are socially favored, is likely to continue to be
immense.218 The size of the problem Smolensky is attempting to solve
shrinks with each condition: (1) only a small number of parents will
want to give their child socially disfavored physical traits and will resort
to genetic intervention to do so; (2) only some of these parents will be
able to afford genetic intervention; (3) only some of these parents will
follow through despite opposition from physicians and friends; and
(4) only rarely, if ever, will the chosen trait actually do more harm to the
child than good.
The apparent small scope of the problem raises questions about
whether there is a need to adopt a new standard for liability just for
parents who choose to give their child socially disfavored traits. Perhaps
there is a moral basis to prevent genetic intervention generally; but if
that is the case, there is no need to focus the inquiry on whether socially
disfavored traits like disabilities are inherently disadvantageous. As
discussed in the next section, putting parental decisions in favor of
disability on trial is likely to lead to inaccurate results and further
entrench discrimination against those who are physically different.

Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340–41.
Id. at 300.
218
See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 779 (“Societal pressures . . . to bring only ‘nondefective’ children into the world, can obtain such widespread currency that they become
assumptions of medical, legal, spiritual, and community institutions, to the point of
obviating entirely the need for government action in this area.”); see also Longmore, supra
note 179, at 221 (discussing the relationship between conceptions of wholeness and of being
valid Americans).
216
217
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IV. THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE IN A WORLD WHERE IRRATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION PERSISTS
Smolensky suggests that in the context of genetic intervention we
should alter the standard in tort law used to determine when a genetic
change results in a cognizable injury.219 Under her approach, judges and
juries would ask whether the genetic intervention violated the child’s
right to an open future.220 Using the open future analysis, Smolensky
argues that courts should decide whether parents who select in favor of
disability are reasonable in doing so.221
Scholars have proposed a variety of different models for evaluating
the legal obligations between parents and children.222 Rather than
attempting to compare and critique these various models, this Part
focuses on the practical problems that derive from using the open future
test to assess the consequences of disability. This focus points to more
general problems with the way in which scholars, judges, and the media
have approached the intersection between genetics and disability. The
open future test proposed by Smolensky fails to address the
incompetence of juries to evaluate the consequences of disability or the
social problems with categorizing certain socially disfavored physical
features as harmful.
A. Of “Sound” Bodies and “Open” Futures
Smolensky finds some support for the open future approach in a
series of cases that make reference to a child’s “right to begin life with a
sound mind and body.”223 These cases, she argues, manifest a judicial
movement toward recognizing that children have a moral right to be
born free from impediments.224
Even if these cases did describe a legitimate moral right, the “right to
a sound body” provides an impossible and arbitrary standard for
evaluating damages. The problems with using the right to a sound body
to determine harm are very much the same as the problems with using
the open future framework to assess harm. Both approaches purport to
use an objective standard to measure harm, when in fact they rely upon
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 337.
Id. at 311. Davis also supports the “open future” approach; however, she does not call
for new laws to enforce it. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26, 30.
221
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340.
222
See Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority, supra note 73, at 30–33.
223
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 302. For the sake of brevity, I refer to
the “right to begin life with a sound mind and body” simply as the “right to a sound
body.”
224
Id. at 312.
219
220
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artificial, subjective notions about what makes a person complete.
Ultimately, both approaches fail to measure whether the plaintiff has
actually suffered harm and instead presume harm whenever the plaintiff
has a different body type or experience than most people expect in life.
In Smith v. Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court made the
following comment when attempting to explain why a child should be
permitted to recover against a third party for prenatal injuries:
[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized that a
child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind
and body. If the wrongful conduct of another interferes
with that right, and it can be established by competent
proof that there is a causal connection between the
wrongful interference and the harm suffered by the
child when born, damages for such harm should be
recoverable by the child.225
Aside from the conclusory assertion that “justice requires” the “legal
right to begin life with a sound mind and body,” the Brennan court made
no attempt to explain the basis or scope of this newly invented right.
Nonetheless, a number of courts have quoted this language to support
liability for prenatal injuries, but with little analysis of their own.226
The problem is that this “right” is artificial and vague. Even when
there has been no tortious conduct, children are born with a variety of
different characteristics and abilities, some of which might be considered
“sound” and others that might be called “unsound.” Simply because
society tends to identify a certain set of characteristics as “normal” or
“sound,” does not mean that a child has been harmed if born without
these characteristics. Indeed, the characteristics we associate with a
“sound” body might not even be those that are particularly common.
Medical studies suggest that one third of the adults in the United States
are obese, but most people would probably not say that children have

157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960).
See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971); Grodin v. Grodin,
301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J.
1967); Draper v. Jasionowski, 858 A.2d 1141, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Sylvia v.
Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I. 1966); see also Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236,
239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (N.J. Bergen County Ct.
1961) (referring to right to sound mind and body to support taking custody of child to
provide blood transfusion against parents’ wishes); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla.
1976); Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex. App. 1967) (Cadena,
J, dissenting), rev’d 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967).
225
226
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the right to be born with a tendency toward obesity.227 A “sound” body
is really a body that has the characteristics those making the decisions
prefer.
The subjective and protean nature of the “sound body” standard
invites decisions based upon stereotypes. Thus, in Stallman, the Illinois
Supreme Court expressly rejected the “right to a sound mind and body”
language because it suggests a duty of the mother to guarantee her child
has socially favored characteristics.228 The court asked:
By what objective standard could a jury be guided in
determining whether a pregnant woman did all that was
necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not
interfere with her fetus’ separate and independent right
to be born whole? In what way would prejudicial and
stereotypical beliefs about the reproductive abilities of
women be kept from interfering with a jury’s
determination of whether a particular woman was
negligent at any point during her pregnancy?229
By cloaking cultural conceptions in the seemingly objective measure of
“soundness,” the right to a sound body permits juries to express their
prejudices as though they were objective moral imperatives.
It is true that the environment we live in appears to be more suited
to some physical body-types than others. A person who uses a
wheelchair cannot always access buildings and events as easily as those
who walk. Persons who are exceptionally tall must duck to get into most
cars. And people who are perceived as not being “good-looking” face
challenges in both their jobs and social lives.230 Although we might
assume that judges and juries find bodies “unsound” when those bodies
are incompatible with our social and physical environment, this is not
necessarily true. In fact, as discussed below, decision makers tend to
misjudge the consequences of socially disfavored physical
characteristics.231 Moreover, by calling certain bodies “unsound,” the
right to a sound body jurisprudence relocates environmental and social
227
See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999–
2008, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 235, 235 (2010), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/
content/full/303/3/235?ijkey=ijKHq6YbJn3Oo&keytype=ref&siteid=amajnls.
228
Stallman v. Youngquist, N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988).
229
Id. at 360. Shepherd makes a similar point: “When values, risk tolerance, faith, love,
fear, and biological impulse naturally and necessarily factor into a decision, it is impossible
to say whether the decision is reasonable or unreasonable.” Shepherd, supra note 19, at 805.
230
See Jeff E. Biddle & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination:
Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172 (1998).
231
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the misperception of disabilities).
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problems—like discrimination and lack of access—to the physical body
of the person being subjected to prejudice. This displacement of fault
onto the plaintiff discourages necessary changes to the social and
environmental status quo.
Thus far, none of the courts referencing the right to a sound body
have evoked the right as a means for determining whether the plaintiff
suffered actual harm. The language of the “sound body” jurisprudence,
however, seems to suggest that there is no need to consider whether the
plaintiff is actually worse off because of defendant’s actions. Instead, it
would appear that the court may simply look to whether the defendant
caused the plaintiff to have characteristics that are different from the
court’s conception of a sound body. Rather than evaluating whether the
plaintiff’s physical state has had an overall harmful effect on the plaintiff,
courts can assume harm based purely on the fact that the plaintiff is
physically different. This approach unfairly suggests that simply
because a plaintiff has unusual attributes, the plaintiff must have been
harmed. Shepherd explains:
Rather than signifying merely the limits of others’
tortious behavior, the language of the “right to a sound
mind and body” exhibits an independence from others’
noxious conduct and connotes an affirmative obligation
on the part of other people to eliminate any obstacles,
natural or otherwise, to achieve this societal concept of a
sound mind and body.232
The “right to an open future” similarly invites courts to conflate
damages with difference. Like the right to a sound body jurisprudence,
the open future test implies the existence of a right that does not
normally exist. People are born into a wide variety of circumstances
with a variety of physical abilities. Those who are born into poverty do
not have the same opportunities as those born with wealth. Those who
are born blind do not have the same opportunities as those born sighted.
Certainly, all persons are not born with an equal array of opportunities,
regardless of whether their parents use genetic intervention.233
232
Shepherd, supra note 19, at 770. A similar problem arises in wrongful life cases. See
Hensel, supra note 179, at 144 (“Rather than focusing on a defendant’s conduct, as in a
traditional tort action, both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits ultimately focus on the
plaintiff’s disability, a status that is at least partially a societal construction.”).
233
Davis concedes that her reference to a “right” to an open future is more
“metaphorical” than literal. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 46. She asserts, however, that having a
child who happens to be born into poverty or is otherwise limited in opportunities is
different from deliberately giving a child attributes that limit the child’s options. Id. at 84.
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Asking the question of whether a child’s right to an open future has
been violated implies that any departure from what is commonly
accepted as a normal future violates the child’s inalienable right. Just as
the right to a sound body prefers certain physical attributes, the right to
an open future gives preference to a certain array of opportunities in life.
A person born with hearing is limited in her ability to enter Deaf culture.
But we are apt to treat deafness as a restriction on one’s future
opportunities because our society tends to value hearing culture above
Deaf culture.234 Commentators automatically assume that it is better to
be born hearing than deaf—not because people who cannot hear have
less appealing opportunities in life by some objective standard, but
because most people think that the opportunities afforded the hearing are
better than those given the Deaf.235 The “open future” language is code
for those generally accepted activities that most people think they want
to experience in life. Simply because an experience is common or valued
highly by a dominant group does not mean that the experience is
superior to other activities or that a child has suffered harm if she does
not have the opportunity for those experiences. There may well be
This distinction suggests that what Davis calls a “right to an open future” is really a right to
not to have one’s genetic identity manipulated in ways that might constrain one’s
opportunities in life. But every genetic manipulation, if effective, changes the child’s
genetic identity and thereby changes the child’s opportunities in life. For example, if my
parents give me great intelligence, I might never be able to enjoy low-brow movies; if they
give me low intelligence, I may never appreciate high-brow ones. Davis would likely
argue that the right to an open future is violated only if the parents’ choice prevents the
child from having a “wide variety” of opportunities. Id. My concern is that what
constitutes a “wide variety” will be decided based on overgeneralizations about what
opportunities are valuable. This problem is exacerbated by the implication that children
have an independent right to activities the dominant culture deems superior.
234
Davis argues that choosing deafness for a child violates the child’s right to an open
future because the Deaf community is relatively small and those who are deaf often have
difficulty with written language. These consequences, she argues, unreasonably narrow a
deaf child’s social and vocational opportunities. However, even if Davis is correct about
the scope of opportunities available to a deaf child, her conclusion that these opportunities
are inferior to those permitted a hearing child relies upon value judgments about what
makes for a complete life. Is it better to be part of a large, impersonal community than to
be part of small, intimate one? See Dennis, supra note 169 (some assert that there is greater
intimacy among members of the Deaf community). Is it better to have more job and
marriage prospects than less? Some might say that it is better to have a few meaningful
opportunities than to have myriad unfulfilling ones. Simply because the dominant culture
thinks more is better than less and bigger is better than smaller does not mean that those
values are correct or applicable to every situation.
235
See Jones, supra note 9, at 223 (stating genetic intervention should not be permitted
when used for “things that virtually anyone would agree are harmful,” such as to create a
deaf child); Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–20 (“Under an objective
standard of offense the creation of genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia are
almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”).
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uncommon and unpopular experiences in life that are more valuable
than the ones that most people seek. Some may, as Longmore suggests,
“prize not self-sufficiency but self-determination, not independence but
interdependence, not functional separateness but personal connection,
not physical autonomy but human community.”236
The problems with the open future framework reflect a more
fundamental ambiguity in the discourse regarding genetic intervention.
Commentators frequently distinguish between “therapeutic” and
“nontherapeutic” interventions, or between “enhancements” and
“diminishments.”237 But these terms have meaning only by reference to
some subjective standard for what makes a person whole.238 Some
would consider it therapeutic to modify the DNA of an embryo that has
the phenotype for deafness so that it has the phenotype for hearing.
Others would consider this modification diminishing.239 In either case,
the embryo will have a different identity and experience than it would
have had without intervention. As discussed in the next section, judges
and juries cannot accurately measure the degree to which such a change
will be an advantage or disadvantage for the child.
B. Pervasive Misperception of Disability
As discussed above, courts have repeatedly recognized that judges
and juries are ill-equipped to assess accurately the subtleties of intraThis assessment becomes all the more
family relationships.240
problematic when the jury attempts to determine the consequences of
physical attributes that most of them have never experienced.241 In the
usual tort action, jurors draw from their own experiences to do what
juries do best—decide whether conduct violates community values. The
open future test asks juries to do something much more speculative and
236
Longmore, supra note 179, at 222. In his critique of scholarship advancing the social
model of disability, Adam Samaha recognizes an important, though underdeveloped,
implication of the social model of disability: “[The social model’s insights might] suggest a
class of decisionmakers different from the group that other perspectives suggest.” Samaha,
supra note 185, at 1254. In the context of genetic interventions in favor of disability, the
social model points to the problems with relying on outsiders to decide what it is like to
have physical traits associated with disability.
237
Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority, supra note 73, at 960, 985; see also Cohen, supra
note 200, at 349.
238
To some extent, Cohen recognizes this problem in responding to Smolensky. See
Cohen, supra note 200, at 349–50.
239
See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 67–69; Longmore, supra note 179, at 221–22.
240
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (suggesting that social, cultural, economic,
and philosophical factors that shape parental discretion and authority should not be
second-guessed).
241
A similar objection applies to wrongful life cases. See Hensel, supra note 179, at 185.
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subject to bias—determine the future consequences of having a
This inquiry adopts wholesale the
particular physical trait.242
assumption of the medical model that physical features carry inherent
limitations that can be scientifically explained and assessed.243 Juries,
guided by purportedly “expert” testimony from physicians who are
steeped in the medical model, are likely to base their decisions on deepseated biases and negative stereotypes about disability.244 Generally,
juries tend to “emphasize evidence consistent with [their] own views
and attitudes while . . . discount[ing] or ignor[ing] evidence inconsistent
with [their] attitudes.”245
The artificial, subjective nature of the open future test is particularly
problematic in the context of disability because people tend to
overestimate the harms associated with disability and underestimate the
extent to which those harms are socially created. Carol J. Gill
summarizes the counterintuitive results of research on quality of life and
disability:
A remarkably consistent finding across studies using
widely varying samples and methods is that life
satisfaction does not diminish with increasing degree of
physical impairment. In fact, several studies indicate
that persons with “severe” physical disabilities, such as
spinal cord quadriplegia and neuromuscular disabilities
requiring mechanical ventilation, express greater life
satisfaction than do those with less disabling
conditions.246

242
The reference to a “right” to an open future gives the appearance that juries are
contemplating a moral question, when in fact they are speculating about the future based
on general assumptions.
243
See Hensel, supra note 179, at 183 (discussing similar problematic assumptions in
wrongful life cases).
244
Id. at 185.
245
M. Neil Browne et al., The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System,
50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 454 (2006); see also Monica K. Miller, Alayna Jehle & Alicia
Summers, From Kobe Bryant to Saddam Hussein: A Descriptive Examination and Psychological
Analysis of How Religion Likely Affected Twenty-Five Recent High-Profile Trials, 9 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (noting that “jurors tend to be more lenient toward defendants who
follow society’s norms”).
246
Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 529 (2000)
(citations omitted); see also Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184, at 1359–61 (discussing
prevalence of unconscious discrimination “even amongst people who profess strong
egalitarian beliefs”).
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This research suggests a serious flaw in the common assumption that
having more capabilities is better than having less. In addition,
surprising to some, research suggests that healthcare professionals—the
gate-keepers of ART and the most likely expert witnesses in genetic
intervention litigation—significantly underestimate the quality of life of
persons with disabilities.247 Gill concludes that “the gap between health
professionals and people with disabilities in evaluating life with
disability is consistent and stunning.”248
The urge to prevent parents from using genetic intervention to select
in favor of disability arguably does not come from direct hostility toward
persons with disabilities.
It is, instead, a case of misguided
benevolence—an impulse based upon the presumption that disability is
inherently tragic. Equating disability with suffering embraces the
medical model’s central tenet that physical difference is a misfortune to
be avoided or overcome, but not embraced. Shepherd explains why this
attempt at benevolence is problematic:
The creation of rights in response to someone’s or
some group’s suffering assumes that we as a society can
identify when suffering is taking place. But suffering is
individual and personal, and not always obvious. Many
well-meaning people who do not live with disabilities
will assume that a fetus with disabilities will suffer if
brought to term. Yet people living with disabilities and
persons working and living with disabled people often
say otherwise.249
Although the medical model of disability has been challenged
repeatedly, commentators discussing genetics still tend to assume
disability is synonymous with detriment. Commentators conclude, with
little or no analysis, that: (1) having a disability means having fewer
capabilities; and (2) “reasonable” people would rather have more
abilities rather than less.250 This analysis, of course, fails to recognize
that abilities and opportunities are not uniformly valued or
mathematically measured; that capabilities are not inherent and
permanent but are affected by environmental and social factors; that
Gill, supra note 246, at 530.
Id.
249
Shepherd, supra note 19, at 782; see also Dunne & Warren, supra note 28, at 168
(“Though a noble goal worth pursuing, reducing affliction must not be accomplished by
targeting individuals having, or perceived as having conditions considered undesirable.”).
250
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 9, at 223; Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at
319–20.
247
248
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having more physical functions does not necessarily mean having
greater opportunities and happiness; and that reasonable people may
place different values on common experiences and norms. If even
persons somewhat educated about disability and genetics tend to
presume harm, it is unlikely that juries will be able to see beyond the old
stereotype that disability is inherently tragic.
C. The Problems with Treating Prospective Discrimination as Harm
As discussed above, parents would face significant obstacles in
attempting to convince a jury that a disability like deafness or short
stature is not inevitably tragic. This, however, is only the first great
hurdle for parents attempting to avoid liability. Under Smolensky’s
approach, a genetic intervention could be considered harmful if,
although not inherently limiting, the intervention gives the child
attributes that subject the child to discrimination. Returning to the
example of parents who use genetic intervention to have a deaf child,
Smolensky argues genetic deafness may violate the child’s right to an
open future because “environmental factors are not changing rapidly
enough to alleviate harm caused by a disabling trait.”251
Smolensky is correct that persons with disabilities face significant
social and environmental obstacles, such as prejudice and inaccessible
areas, that arguably limit the life opportunities of persons with
disabilities in some cases.252 She may also be correct that negative
assumptions about disability will likely persist even in the future when
the technology for genetic intervention is available. But even if we
assume that the negative social consequences of a particular disability
will at times outweigh the benefits of the physical trait—and that it is
possible to evaluate the benefits and burdens with any degree of
accuracy—this does not justify holding the parents liable for choosing a
disfavored physical trait.
There is something sadly ironic about using the existence of
discrimination as a reason to prevent the creation of the traits that subject
a person to discrimination. In effect, we are saying that even if society’s
views are wrong, those views should constrain parents’ ability to make
choices about their children. As discussed below, this “social harm
approach” is unfair to parents and would serve to further entrench
discrimination. In the context of genetic testing and intervention, the

Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418.
See Areheart, supra note 178, at 188 (asserting that many of the challenges persons with
disabilities face are socially construed barriers that limit participation in mainstream
society).
251
252
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law should take a normative rather than a descriptive approach to
evaluating the consequences of disability.
1.

Over-Deterrence and the “New Eugenics”253

The first problem with the social harm approach is that it rests
precariously on the edge of a slippery slope. If we presume a child has
suffered legally cognizable harm whenever parents choose to give the
child a trait that will subject the child to discrimination, then parents
could be found liable for choosing any among a wide variety of socially
disfavored physical traits.254 It is not difficult to imagine children
claiming that they will suffer discrimination because of the skin color,
gender, or other physical characteristic chosen by the parents. Parents
may have legitimate reasons for wanting their child to be of a particular
race or gender or to have certain traits, such as deafness, that correspond
with the parents’ identity and culture. These attributes could benefit the
child as well as the social group the child joins. Under the social harm
approach, however, parents risk liability if they fail to choose the
attributes that a jury will recognize as socially beneficial.
Because social values change over time, parents will be unable to
know in advance which traits will subject the parents to liability years
later when the child has reached majority and decides to sue her parents.
This is especially hard with disabilities because it is difficult to predict
how changes in the law will affect environmental obstacles and social
attitudes toward disability.255 Moreover, given the small number of
parents who want to offer their child an unpopular physical trait, many
years will pass before there is any clear precedent establishing which
physical traits are found to violate a child’s right to an open future and
which ones are fair game. Parents who know their actions will be judged
after the fact based on future social conditions will be hesitant to choose
any trait that could possibly subject them to litigation. In this way, the
social harm approach would prevent parents from choosing a wide array
of physical traits, many of which may not actually be harmful to the
child.

Fox, supra note 23, at 569.
But see Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105, 1111–12 (Or. 1978) (noting that while in other
situations it may be appropriate to award damages based solely on emotional harm, this
rationale does not apply to parent-child relationships).
255
See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008)
(discussing how the expected social and environmental impacts of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 failed to materialize).
253
254
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The problem of over-deterrence has broad implications. Some
scholars have warned that if genetic intervention is legal and readily
available, we will see physical diversity shrink as parents feel pressured
to use genetic intervention to give their children the most prestigious
physical traits. Some predict a Gattaca-esque world where those who are
naturally born with traits that are viewed as imperfections become part
of a lower caste, a minority rejected and demoralized for their inborn
failings.256 Fox refers to the laissez-faire approach to genetic intervention
as a “new eugenics”257—because he believes it could lead to further
marginalization and eradication of members of disfavored groups.258
If widely available genetic intervention threatens physical and
cultural diversity, then this threat can only be made worse by a legal
scheme that punishes parents who seek to give their children unpopular
physical traits. Under the social harm approach, parents could freely
choose to give their child any of the attributes commonly favored in
society, but they could not consider other physical traits without risking
liability. The social harm approach is not truly “eugenic” inasmuch as it
is not a state-sponsored attempt to cleanse the population of
characteristics presumed inferior.259 But the social harm approach
threatens a eugenic consequence: through civil tort liability, the state
would implicitly condemn and punish the creation of socially disfavored
physical attributes while permitting the creation of physical attributes
that society deems beneficial.
2.

Parents with Disabilities

A second problem with the social harm approach is that it limits
parental discretion to conform with dominant social views. Smolensky
admits that parents who might use genetic intervention in favor of
disability would do so with good intentions.260 Nonetheless, she argues
that there is a danger of parents imprudently selecting attributes that
will be bad for the child.261
It must be noted that in Smolensky’s analysis the misguided parents
who cannot be trusted to choose the best traits for their child are usually
parents with disabilities. Arguing that the threat of harm to children is
256
Fox, supra note 23, at 572 (summarizing arguments regarding polarization and
critiquing them).
257
Id. at 569.
258
Id. at 607–12.
259
See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57 (2008).
260
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 308–09.
261
Id. at 305, 317.
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real, Smolensky tells of an “[o]ff-the-record” story about parents of short
stature strong-arming their physician to implant an embryo that has the
genotype for achondroplasia:
According to one account, parents with achondroplasia
told their physician that if he refused to help them select
a child with achondroplasia, they would go to another
IVF clinic, refuse PGD testing, get pregnant, have the
fetus tested via amniocentesis for achondroplasia, and
abort any child not carrying the gene. . . . Not wanting to
be the cause of an unnecessary abortion and recognizing
that the end result would be the same with or without
his assistance (a child with achondroplasia), the
physician agreed to help the parents utilize PGD to
select for a child with achondroplasia.262
Those who find the actions of the parents in this story reprehensible
would probably find the behavior just as bad, or perhaps worse, if the
parents had been threatening to abort any child that did not test with the
genotype for blue eyes. Because this story focuses on disabled parents, it
might be misread as implying that disabled parents are irrational or
amoral.263
Smolensky likely focuses on parents with disabilities because she
assumes that disabled parents are more likely than others to choose traits
that are associated with disabilities.264 If this assumption is correct,
however, then the legal scheme Smolensky proposes would fall harder
on parents with disabilities than others.265 Parents who are not disabled
could choose to select a child with their own physical attributes while
parents with disabilities could not make such a choice without risking
liability.

Id. at 305 (footnotes omitted).
I do not think Smolensky intends this story to suggest such a sweeping and politically
incorrect statement. I point out the implied meaning, however, because historically
Western culture has often punctuated the moral depravity of characters by giving them
unusual physical traits.
264
There is a reason for this. Parents with disabilities might want to have children who
have socially disfavored traits. See supra Part III.A (discussing why parents may choose to
give their child a disability).
265
See Templeton, supra note 32: “If choice of embryos for implantation is to be given to
citizens in general, and if hearing and other people are allowed to choose embryos that will
be ‘like them’, sharing the same characteristics, language and culture, then we believe that
deaf people should have the same right.” (quoting Francis Murphy, chairman of the British
Deaf Association)).
262
263
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Parental autonomy takes on new meaning when the parents are
themselves disabled.
Historically, courts and legislators have
underestimated the ability of parents with disabilities to make
responsible reproductive decisions and care for their children. Carl H.
Coleman explains:
In the early part of the twentieth century, many states
passed laws requiring the sterilization of certain
categories of persons, a primary goal of which was to
prevent people with disabilities from having children.
The constitutionality of these laws was upheld in Buck v.
Bell, in which Justice Holmes, upholding the involuntary
sterilization of an allegedly “feeble minded white
woman,” famously declared that “three generations of
imbeciles are enough.” While Buck v. Bell has been
criticized extensively, the U.S. Supreme Court has never
expressly overruled it.
....
While coercive eugenics laws fell out of favor after
World War II, the perception that individuals with
disabilities cannot be good parents has remained
widespread.
In many states, laws governing the
termination of parental rights specify a parent’s
disability as a factor to consider in terminating the
parent’s rights.
Courts sometimes interpret these
statutes as creating a presumption that individuals with
disabilities are unable to parent: “[D]eaf parents are
thought to be incapable of effectively stimulating
language skills; blind parents cannot provide adequate
attention or discipline; and parents with spinal cord
injuries cannot adequately supervise their children.”
These beliefs, as Dave Shade notes, reflect the “all-toofamiliar picture of the parent with a disability: unable to
provide care, unable to provide love, unable to be a
parent.”266

266
Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 24–26 (2002) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
See also generally Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of Happiness: Parents with
Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 LAW & INEQ. 153, 159 (1998); Michael
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Given the persistence of discrimination against disabled parents,
Coleman argues, “there is a real danger that disability-related denials of
ARTs will be based on ignorance or bias against people with
disabilities.”267
This unsightly history of discrimination against parents with
disabilities does not suggest that disabled parents will always make the
right genetic decisions for their children. It does, however, give reason
to suspect that judges and juries will fail to give such parents the full
deference they deserve. We should be wary of any approach that
attempts to second-guess parental decisions, especially when those
decisions are being made by parents who are inappropriately assumed
to be inadequate.
3.

Legitimizing Discrimination

A final problem with the social harm approach, and with the open
future structure generally, is the message it sends about the
consequences of disability. The negative message sent by the open
future approach to disability has both public and private effects.
There is some similarity between the implied message of wrongful
life actions and that of lawsuits based on genetic intervention in favor of
disability. Both communicate a similar, disempowering message: “as a
matter of law, your impairment, standing alone, is a sufficient basis upon
which to evaluate the quality of your life.”268 This negative message
becomes personal, and is more likely to be internalized, when the
disability becomes the subject of litigation.
Children would be
compelled to offer testimony of how the traits their parents chose for
them have made it so they cannot enjoy a complete life. And jury
verdicts in the child’s favor would suggest state approval of the view
that persons with socially disfavored physical traits are destined for a life
of woe and misery.
Also problematic, the open future approach promotes unnecessary
conflict between the interests of the parents and what we assume to be
the interests of the child. When this conflict interferes with the parentchild relationship, it may do more harm than a miscalculation by the
parents about which physical traits are best for their child. Discussing
parents who choose not to terminate pregnancy when they discover they
are having a child with a genetic anomaly, Shepherd writes:
Ashley Stein, Mommy Has a Blue Wheelchair: Recognizing the Parental Rights of Individuals
with Disabilities, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1069, 1083 (1994).
267
Coleman, supra note 266, at 20.
268
Hensel, supra note 179, at 174 (discussing the message sent by wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions).
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[I]t is not that parents make the best decisions for their
children, but that it is generally best for children, or
children-to-be, for parents to make these decisions. By
deferring to the parents in this regard, we recognize
value in the bond that exists between parent and child, a
bond that first develops, in the usual instance, between
mother and fetus.269
Although Shepherd does not address either the right to an open future
or genetic intervention, she criticizes courts and commentators who
attempt to balance the child’s right to bodily integrity against the
mother’s right to bodily integrity.270 Instead of focusing on presumed
competing rights of the mother and fetus, Shepherd argues, we should
recognize a common right that benefits mother and fetus, “a right to
attachment”:
[T]his conception of the right recognizes that the
interests of these two “beings” are generally aligned. It
arises from the needs of the child, developing now as a
fetus, because children need to belong, to be a welcomed
member of their family. Their need to belong is
threatened when we evaluate parental decisions made
concerning their welfare within a rights analysis that
depends on conflict.271
This right to attachment recognizes that assessments about quality of life
are primarily subjective and that failing to respect the parent-fetal
relationship weakens the ties between parent and child.272
The problem with the open future framework is not simply that
some persons with disabilities might be offended by its implied
messages. The problem is that in the course of litigation those messages
create conflicts where they may not already exist and would also fortify
unproductive stereotypes about the value of persons who have socially
disfavored physical traits.

Shepherd, supra note 19, at 799.
Id. at 793–94, 796–97.
271
Id. at 798.
272
Id. at 805 (“The right to attachment protects decisions that most members of society
would regard as unreasonable as well as those it would think reasonable. When values,
risk tolerance, faith, love, fear, and biological impulse naturally and necessarily factor into
a decision, it is impossible to say whether the decision is reasonable or unreasonable.”).
269
270
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V. THE MOTHER OF INVENTION273
Why has so much of the debate over genetic intervention focused on
whether parents ought to be able to genetically engineer their child to
have traits associated with disability? Certainly, it is not because there is
a large population of parents longing to create children with disabilities.
There would be little controversy in asking why parents might want
to give their child blue eyes. Asking why parents might choose to give
their child a disability is much more provocative because it draws into
conflict two perspectives: on the one hand, the traditional presumption
that disability is inherently tragic, and on the other hand, the modern call
for politically correct discussion of disability.274
When considering genetic intervention in favor of disability, we
must reach beyond both of these limited perspectives. Policies in this
area should not rely, overtly or impliedly, upon the old stereotype that
disability is inherently tragic. Nor should policies be set merely to
satisfy ephemeral notions of political correctness. The problem with
asking juries to decide whether a particular physical trait is harmful or
beneficial is that the question itself implies that physical traits are
inherently helpful or harmful and that public perceptions of disability
are legitimate. The consequences of having physical traits associated
with disability are not objectively discernable or uniform in nature; they
derive from protean social attitudes and environments. Parents, who
have personal experience with the physical traits in question, are better
equipped to decide what is best for their offspring than jurors who have
less experience and less at stake. Second-guessing parental decisions
about socially disfavored physical traits only disrupts the parent-child
relationship and suggests that discriminatory attitudes and practices are
natural and acceptable.
Of course, there are other options. Rather than imposing tort
liability on parents, we could pass legislation that prohibits the use of
genetic intervention to choose certain traits or requires physicians to
273
The proverb, “necessity is the mother of invention,” first appears in English print in
1545: “Necessitie, the inuentor of all goodnesse (as all authours in a maner, doo
saye) . . . inuented a shaft heed.” OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERBS 214 (Jennifer Speake,
ed. 2003) (quoting ROGER ASCHAM, TOXOPHILUS II. 18V (1545)). A slightly earlier proverb
takes the point a step further: “Necessity knows no law.” Id.
274
The dramatic force of this question is used to capture readers’ attention. Thus, for
example, Davis opens her book on ethical issues in reproductive technologies with a
fictional story of Celia, a woman of short stature who wanted a child with similar traits.
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 1–5. Smolensky adds an air of mystique to the controversy,
introducing her article as developing out of “back-of-the-room conversations” and relying
upon “[o]ff-the-record” conversations. Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at
299, 305.
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evaluate the appropriateness of genetic interventions on a case-by-case
basis. Both of these approaches carry problems of their own. Physicians
are notoriously biased in favor of existing social norms.275 And
legislatures may not be much better than juries at evaluating the benefits
and drawbacks of physical traits, especially given that social and
environmental factors are constantly in flux.
The debate over genetic intervention has veered down an
unnecessary path. Disabled parents who want disabled children are too
few in number and diverse in purpose to serve as the poster children for
the debate over genetic intervention. If, contrary to the evidence, there is
some threat of parents with disabilities intentionally or recklessly using
genetic intervention to inflict pain and distress on their child, then we
already have civil and criminal remedies to address such behavior. We
need not expand tort law to meet these remote possibilities. The
potential problems with genetic intervention have little to do with
disability and even less to do with the competence of parents with
disabilities. Common fears about physical difference should not be used
to support asking juries to pass judgment on the cultural and
philosophical values that guide parental decisions.

275
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Gill, supra note 246, at 530; Longmore, supra note 179, at 178–80.

